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The prevailing perspective that leaders are the main agents of influence of followers’ 
behavior is an overly simplistic and incomplete assessment of the interactions between 
leaders and followers. The present research attempts to “reverse the lens” and establish that 
subordinates can and do significantly influence managers’ behaviors. Specifically, I focus 
on how the power of a subordinate influences a manager’s self-interested behaviors. 
Additionally, I explore the perceived necessity of a leader as a context where a manager’s 
behavior may be particularly susceptible to granting subordinates’ requests. Results 
indicate that the salience of a high-power subordinate, as compared to a low-power 
subordinate, influences managers to engage in less self-interested behaviors and be more 
susceptible to granting subordinates’ requests in an attempt to maintain their identity and 
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With a flourish of the conductor’s baton, the orchestra sounds the final note of the 
symphony, and the audience rises in applause. The conductor turns to the audience, and 
with an exaggerated bow, accepts the audience’s ovation. After a moment, the conductor 
extends an arm back toward the orchestra, inviting the audience to also recognize the 
contributions of the orchestra members, but which group is most responsible for the 
performance: the conductor or the orchestra? From the actions of conductors and the 
implicit acceptance of audiences, one may view the conductor as both the leader of the 
orchestra and as the representative entity that deserves the most credit for the performance. 
The vast majority of leadership research would also support the claim that a successful 
performance is contingent upon effective leadership (Avolio, Walumbwa, & Weber, 2009; 
Hackman & Wageman, 2004; Morgeson, DeRue, & Karam, 2009; Yukl, 2012).  
No one pays to see a formally dressed individual wave a small piece of wood in the air 
for hours on end. The ability of the orchestra members to perform the symphony is the real 
reason the audience attends — although some credit for the performance must be given to 
the conductor. The conductor coaches, coordinates, and facilitates the execution  of the 
symphony (Hackman, 2005), but is the conductor the force that drives the performance of 




of the orchestra members? Could the ability of the orchestra actually be the force driving 
the actions of the conductor? 
 
Overview of the Literature 
Whereas the effectiveness of a leader’s influence on followers’ behaviors has been 
thoroughly examined (Avolio et al., 2009; Hogg, 2010), research into the ways in which 
followers influence their leaders’ behavior remains a nascent and growing body of research 
(Shamir, 2007; Uhl-Bien, Riggio, Lowe, & Carsten, 2014). The present research responds 
to the call from Staw (2016) to explore the upward influence of subordinates on certain 
behaviors of their manager. Specifically, I will explore how the attributes of a subordinate 
can affect the behavior of their manager and contexts that can alter that effect. In other 
words, how might the characteristics of orchestra members affect the behaviors of their 
conductor, and are there certain contexts that strengthen or weaken that effect? 
Followership is defined as the effect of followers on their leaders and how followers 
affect the process of leading others (Uhl-Bien et al., 2014). Because leadership involves 
influencing — the capacity to have an effect on another (Hogg, 2010) — others, followers 
(i.e., individuals to be influenced) are an essential component of leadership. Yet much 
leadership research solely focuses on leaders as the causal agents of influence and followers 
as agents influenced by their leaders (Yukl, 2012). In general, the leadership literature 
treats followers as either passive recipients or unintentional moderators of the influence of 
a leader (Bass, 2008) and has largely ignored the idea that whereas leaders may influence 
followers, followers must allow themselves to be influenced (Uhl-Bien & Pillai, 2007). 




(Fairhurst & Uhl-Bien, 2012) has led to a new stream of research that focuses on how 
followers serve as the agents of influence and leaders as agents influenced by their 
followers (Bligh, 2011; Carsten, Uhl-Bien, West, Patera, & McGregor, 2010; Shamir, 
2007; Sy, 2010; Uhl-Bien et al., 2014). The core behaviors of leaders — creating, 
structuring, and coaching groups (Hackman & Wageman, 2004) — all rely on followers to 
grant their leader the influence needed to perform those core behaviors (DeRue & Ashford, 
2010). In other words, our understanding of a manager’s behavior is incomplete without 
also understanding the role subordinates play in shaping their manager’s behaviors.  
The identification of this “followership gap” in the leadership literature led Shamir 
(2007) to call for research to “reverse the lens” and focus on followers as the agents of 
influence and leaders as recipients or moderators of a follower’s influence. Subsequent to 
Shamir’s call, two theoretical views of followership have developed: the constructionist 
view and the role-based view.  
 
Constructionist View of Followership 
The constructionist view considers leadership and followership as cocreated social 
processes (Fairhurst & Grant, 2010). The constructionist view is leadership and 
followership are processes of repeated relational interactions and that the identities, 
relationships, and behaviors of both leaders and followers inform hierarchical roles (DeRue 
& Ashford, 2010). The central focus of constructionist followership research is exploring 
how relational interactions between individuals socially construct leadership and 
followership (Fairhurst & Uhl-Bien, 2012).  




Collinson (2006) laid the groundwork for the constructionist view. He supported an 
identity-based view that individuals must be understood by exploring their social context 
(Layder, 1994). Based on this view of identity, Collinson (2006) argued that the identities 
of followers and leaders must also be explored in their shared social context. In other 
words, exploring leaders and followers as discrete entities only provides a limited 
understanding. By considering the social interactions between leaders and followers, we 
can better understand how followers and leaders shape each other’s identities. Shortly 
thereafter, Shamir (2007) coined the term “co-production” to describe how leadership is 
jointly produced between leaders and followers. Shamir contends that leaders and 
followers share responsibility in the leadership process and asserts that leadership research 
needs to move away from a leader-centric approach and adopt a more balanced view of the 
importance of both leaders and followers. 
 DeRue and Ashford (2010) further developed the constructionist view by introducing 
the concepts of claiming and granting behaviors. Claiming behavior represents the act of 
an individual identifying as either a leader or a follower, and granting behavior represents 
the bestowal of a claimed identity from another individual. According to their theory, the 
process of both leadership and followership begins when one party makes a claim. A claim 
serves as a request to validate a role as either a leader or a follower. By granting a claim, 
the other party not only validates the initial party’s role, but also can make an implicit claim 
on their own role.  
For example, if Individual A makes a claim as a leader and Individual B grants that 
claim, Individual B is also claiming the role as a follower, which would subsequently need 




that “leading” requires claiming and granting behaviors of both parties. DeRue and Ashford 
refute the common conception that formalized hierarchy defines a leader (i.e., an individual 
holding a formal role is a leader). The authors treat leadership and followership roles as 
flexible, dynamic, and potentially reciprocal and posit that leadership cannot be socially 
constructed without a follower granting leadership and taking on a follower role. In all, the 
constructionist view establishes leadership as a social construction and treats followers as 
key figures in understanding a leader’s attitudes, behaviors, and identity. 
Whereas the constructionist view of leaders’ and followers’ identities may be 
particularly beneficial in understanding emergent leadership (Avolio et al., 2009), the 
traditional organizational hierarchy — contrary to the constructionist view — often has 
limited flexibility and dynamism (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Some hierarchical mobility 
is possible in organizations, but the level of dynamic hierarchical permeability suggested 
for the successful coproduction of leadership (DeRue & Ashford, 2010) may be too 
constrained within the hierarchical structure of most organizations. Therefore, even though 
the constructionist view informs the dynamic relationship of managers and subordinates, 
the role-based view of followership may be more beneficial to understanding leadership 
and followership within formal hierarchies in organizations. 
 
Role-Based View of Followership 
The role-based view considers how followership and leadership are enacted within the 
context of a social hierarchy (Carsten et al., 2010). This view focuses on how followers’ 
attributes interact with leaders and how those interactions facilitate or hinder the outcomes 




view broadly explores how a follower’s characteristics and behaviors influence their 
leader’s attitudes and behaviors. The role-based view develops upon early work performed 
by practitioners who identified the importance of followers and attempted to establish 
typologies of follower characteristics and traits (Chaleff, 1995; Howell & Mendez, 2008; 
Kelley, 1999; Lipman-Blumen, 2005; Zaleznik, 1965). These typologies all claim that 
followers have discrete ways in which they can and do choose to follow. Whereas each 
typology varies in what represents an effective follower (e.g., deferent [Taylor, 1947], 
active but subservient [Townsend & Gebhardt, 1998], actively engaged with the leader 
[Kelley, 1992], or serve as partners with the leader [Chaleff, 1995]), each typology 
contends that the way followers perceive their role will affect the way leaders can manage 
their followers and obtain organizational outcomes.  
Carsten and colleagues (2010) were the first to empirically explore the role orientations 
of followers. Using qualitative methods, Carsten and colleagues identified specific role-
based views held by followers and determined that the role-based views held by followers 
affect the way they interact and support their leaders. Depending on the role-based view of 
the follower, leaders must adjust and adapt their attitudes and behaviors, renegotiate 
organizational roles, risk eliciting suboptimal performance from their followers (Kohles, 
Bligh, & Carsten, 2013), and/or alienate their followers by violating their implicitly held 
beliefs about what it means to be an effective follower (Sy, 2010). Furthermore, the 
subsequent behavior of followers plays an active role in shaping a leader’s behavior 
(Howell & Shamir, 2005). 
Based on the role-based view of followership, Uhl-Bien and colleagues (2014) propose 









Figure 1. Partial model found in Uhl-Bien et al. (2014). 
 
Uhl-Bien and colleagues propose that followership characteristics will affect followers’ 
behaviors, and followership behaviors will interact with leaders’ beliefs and/or behaviors. 
The present research will seek to amend this framework in order to explore a novel 
dimension of the role-based view of followership (see Figure 2). Specifically, I will 
propose that characteristics of subordinates will affect a manager’s beliefs regarding their 
relationships with their subordinates and their subsequent behaviors. This contribution to 
the followership literature will further demonstrate ways in which followers can influence 
leaders’ behaviors. 























hierarchies and how formal roles in organizational hierarchies have certain normative 
expectations or prototypes that guide the acceptable behavior of those holding formal 
authority. Social identity theory is then explored as a mechanism that guides these 
prototypes. A relationship between formal leadership roles and a subordinate’s power is 
posited in regards to a leader’s self-interested and granting behaviors. A leader’s perceived 
necessity is also posited in regards to a leader’s self-interested and granting behaviors. 
Finally, the interaction between formal leadership roles and a leader’s perceived necessity 
is posited in regards to a leader’s self-interested and granting behaviors. 
 
Followership in Organizations 
Many decision makers within organizations believe there is a strong positive 
correlation between effective leaders and organizational performance (Avolio et al., 2009). 
The strong belief in this correlation has resulted in organizations giving increased power 
— in the form of both decision control and increased compensation — to individuals 
holding formal positions of authority (Hackman, 2005). Organizations often believe that 
the behaviors of a manager are positively correlated with organizational success, even if 
there is little substantive evidence of that positive correlation (Hackman & Wageman, 
2007).Whereas organizations often overvalue the contributions of a manager, the 
significance of the contributions of subordinates are often overlooked (Shamir, 2007). The 
present research will explore the degree to which subordinates are responsible for some 
level of a managers’ behavior and how the characteristics of subordinates can influence a 
manager’s behavior.  




affect a manager’s self-interested behaviors. Furthermore, I also look at a common 
organizational context — when a leader is less necessary — that may magnify the effect 
subordinates may have on managers’ behavior. In doing so, the hope is to alter how 
organizations view and value followers and encourage more inclusive academic 
conversation around leadership that incorporates both leaders and followers.  
 
Power and Self-Interested Behavior 
Power is defined as the asymmetrical control of resources (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), 
and self-interested behavior is defined as actions that benefit the self, irrespective of the 
common good (Miller, 1999). The relationship between power and self-interested behavior 
is both thoroughly researched and complicated. Two bodies of power research have 
developed in relation to self-interested behaviors (DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic, 
2012). Initially, power research focused on validating the popularized phrase that, “power 
tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” (Acton, 1907). Power has been 
shown to lead to corruption (Kipnis, 1972), a proclivity to denigrate others (Keltner, 
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), a heightened sensitivity to obtaining rewards (Galinsky, 
Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003), a decreased sensitivity to threats, (Croizet & Claire, 1998), 
and overall behavioral disinhibition (Gruenfeld, Keltner, & Anderson, 2003). In sum, this 
body of research demonstrates that power generally leads to self-interested behaviors and 
a decreased sensitivity to others’ needs or wants (Galinsky, Gilin, & Maddux, 2011).  
The other body of power research links power with prosocial outcomes. Some 
examples of research demonstrating “positive” consequences of power include increased 




acting on ones’ moral principles (DeCelles et al., 2012). Whereas these two bodies of 
research appear to run counter to one another, more recent work has suggested that pro-
social behaviors may simply be strategic means of obtaining or maintaining power (Tost, 
Gino, & Larrick, 2013). The present research will address one way in which both selfish 
and prosocial behavioral consequences of power — specifically I introduce the willingness 
to accommodate the needs of others as a consequence of power — can be simultaneously 
present in formal leaders. There has also been some work in this area on the differential 
effects of power and other constructs (Blader & Chen, 2012), but due to the scope of the 
present research, I will solely focus on power. 
Having formal authority (i.e., being made a manager) grants an individual some level 
of positional power (Keltner et al., 2003). When individuals gain power, they are inclined 
to make self-serving attributions (Kipnis, 1972). Power causes individuals to form 
simplistic impressions of those over whom they have power (Woike, 1994) and base their 
own behavior on self-serving expectancies (Copeland, 1994) and stereotypes (Fiske, 1993). 
Powerful individuals are less inclined to engage in perspective taking and, therefore, more 
likely to pursue behaviors that satisfy self-interest irrespective of the common good 
(Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006), but there is tension between the self-
interested motives resulting from increased power and the sense of responsibility for those 
over which one has power (Tost, 2015).  
Recently, organizations have placed increased emphasis on the importance of 
accountability and responsibility over others when exercising power (Hollander, 2012). 
Others researchers have argued that a power holder’s ability to maintain power is grounded 




(Biggart & Hamilton, 1984). One such social expectation is that power holders need to be 
viewed as acting in socially responsible ways by those they lead (Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, 
& Kraus, 2008). In fact, Schilpzand, Hekman, and Mitchell (2014) found that enhanced 
power was a key factor in triggering individuals to have an increased sense of responsibility 
to act on the behalf of those over which they have power. This lends credence to the 
common military adage that the first rule of military leadership is to feed the troops first 
(Doerr, 1997; Harris, 1996). 
To be effective and maintain their power, leaders must find a way to manage their self-
interested desires within the bounds of the social expectations of power holders. Because 
leadership is a dynamic process of influence between at least two parties (DeRue & 
Ashford, 2010), individuals who obtain formal power can develop their social expectations 
based on their interactions with their subordinates (Hogg, 2001b). A leader’s power often 
comes by way of a formal position (Keltner et al., 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Formal 
authority bestowed on a leader is laden with both social expectations and a psychological 
need to meet those expectations (Bettencourt & Sheldon, 2001; Biddle, 1986; Turner, 
1990). One way in which those social expectations and needs are formed can be explained 
through social identity theory. 
  
Leader Prototypes and Formal Authority 
Social identity is formed through a system of social constructions that define where an 
individual “fits” in a given group or organization (Tajfel, 1972). Individuals use intragroup 
social comparisons to determine appropriate values, needs, and behaviors (Feldman, 1984; 




shaped by both social interactions (Turner, 1991) and normative cues (Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Within groups, formal roles (e.g., manager or 
employee) can serve as a normative cue for appropriate behavior (Zucker, 1977). When a 
manager receives formal authority, she engages in a process of self-categorization wherein 
the individual holding formal authority attempts to assimilate her self-identity with an 
embodiment of a representative leader prototype (Turner, 1985). This assimilation 
(depersonalization) is a fusion of how a manager perceives how she “would” act as an 
individual and how she “should” act as manager. Dissonance caused by depersonalization 
is typically resolved by adopting prototypical attitudes and engaging in prototypical 
behaviors (Hogg & Terry, 2000). In other words, if an individual is conflicted on how he 
should act as a manager, he typically engages in behaviors that are prototypical of his 
position in a group.  
For instance, Harris (1996) discusses how the first lesson the British military teaches 
its lieutenants is that military officers always eat last. The premise is that military leaders 
have the power to eat first if they so desired but that eating first would violate the prototype 
that those in power have a primary responsibility to take care of the basic needs of those 
they lead. By feeding the troops first, leaders demonstrate their concern for the welfare of 
those they lead — thus establishing or reinforcing their behavior as prototypical of an 
effective leader (Doerr, 1997). This does not necessarily override or even attenuate the self-
interested motives of a leader. Instead, this illustrates an example where the actions and/or 
motives of a leader can be both prosocial and self-interested in nature.  
In groups, individuals attempt to embody relevant prototypes for two reasons. First, 




capacity to which they fill their social roles can affect their evaluations of self-worth 
(Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Prototypes serve as a standard of self-evaluation by which 
individuals can determine how successfully they fill their roles in a group or organization 
(Hogg, 2001a). As individuals conform more closely to prototypical behaviors, they 
evaluate themselves more positively (Turner, 1991). Second, individuals generally want to 
be seen positively by others (Hogg, 1992). This desire to be seen positively by others is 
particularly strong in reference to in-group members (Hogg, 1993). As individuals conform 
more closely to prototypical behaviors, others generally evaluate conforming individuals 
more positively (Hogg, 2001a).  
Particular to leaders’ prototypes, leadership involves influencing others (Hogg, 2010). 
A leader’s influence requires both a leader who claims the authority to influence a follower, 
and a follower who will grant influence to a leader (DeRue & Ashford, 2010). The desire 
to be perceived as prototypical has been suggested to instill leaders with a sense of 
responsibility for their followers well-being that supersedes the sense of entitlement 
received from the bestowal of formal power (Tost, 2015). By engaging in prototypical 
leaders’ behaviors in an organization, managers can legitimize their formal authority with 
their subordinates (Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Gioia & Sims, 1985; Tyler, 2006), and 
managers perceived as prototypical are more likely to receive compliance from their 
subordinates (Berscheid & Reis, 1998). 
 
Social Identity Theory, Formal Authority, and Self-Interested Behavior 
Each member of a group has both a discrete prototype of how a follower should behave 




As prototypes associated with organizational roles are made salient, subordinates evaluate 
managers based on the subordinates’ prototypes of how a manager should behave (Sy, 
2010). Because prototypical leaders have their ideas accepted more readily, have higher 
perceived status, and are more likely to be granted influence by their followers (Hogg, 
2001a), managers should be motivated to be seen as prototypical to more effectively 
influence their subordinates (Haslam, Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1995). Leaders also have 
their own prototypes of how a leader should behave (Lord, Foti, & De Vader, 1984). A 
manager’s expectations of how managers should behave evolves dynamically through 
interactions with their subordinates in an organization (Shamir, 2007), and one way that 
managers can evaluate the prototypicality of their behavior is through the responses of their 
in-group (e.g., subordinates; Hogg & Terry, 2000). In other words, managers use their 
interactions with subordinates to understand if their behaviors are representative of a 
prototypical managerial behavior; managers who are perceived as behaving more 
prototypically are generally more enduring and influential with their subordinates (Hogg, 
2001a). 
Taxonomies of leaders’ prototypes (Lord et al., 1984; Nye & Forsyth, 1991) and 
behaviors (Hackman & Wageman, 2007; Morgeson et al., 2009) have established a range 
of actions in which prototypical leaders should engage to be perceived as effective leaders. 
One common thread among the literature regarding effective leaders’ actions is that a 
leader’s actions should serve the common good of the group. Subordinates consent to give 
managers some control over resources and decision making with the assumption that 
managers will use that power to enhance group outcomes (Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser, 




group outcomes (i.e., nonprototypical leader behavior) will lose some or all influence over 
their subordinates (Maner & Mead, 2010). While power may lead individuals to become 
narcissistic (Mead, Baumeister, & Vohs, 2009), entitled (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005), 
disinhibited (Galinsky et al., 2003), and self-anchored (Overbeck & Park, 2001), managers 
must maintain some prototypical behaviors that persuade subordinates that their leadership 
is beneficial to the group or organization and not solely self-serving (Hackman & 
Wageman, 2007; Nye & Forsyth, 1991). Therefore, I predict that the salience of a 
subordinate will make leader prototypes more salient to a manager and that managers with 
subordinates salient will attempt to embody a prototypical leader by engaging in less self-
interested behavior. Based on this rationale, I make the following hypothesis: 
H1a — There is an decrease in the self-interested behavior of a manager when a 
subordinate is salient as compared to when no one is salient. 
 
Social Norms Versus Social Identity 
Social normative pressure and/or the mere presence effect could be plausible alternative 
explanations as to why the salience of a subordinate might influence managers to engage 
in less self-interested behavior. Social norms are informal rules that govern and regulate 
behavior (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Social norms establish socially acceptable behavioral 
expectations at either the group (Pepitone, 1976) or individual (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; 
Sherif, 1936) level. Violations of norms can damage the normative violator’s standing in 
an organization (Feldman, 1984) and potentially lead to social ostracism (Triandis, 1994). 
Self-interested behaviors — actions that benefit the self, irrespective of the common good 




scholars credit social norms as the mechanism that attenuates self-interested behavior and 
reinforces the pursuit of social and/or collective needs (Campbell, 1965; Triandis, 1994).  
Even though power insulates individuals from normative pressure to a degree (Galinsky 
et al., 2011; Kipnis, 1976), individuals are less likely to engage in self-interested behavior 
when being monitored by another party because normative expectations are more salient 
(Campbell, 1975; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Furthermore, the social facilitation 
literature has thoroughly demonstrated that the mere presence of another person can cause 
individuals to be more aware of others, be more emotionally aroused, alter behavior, and 
alter task performance (Bond & Titus, 1983; Guerin, 1986, 2010; Zajonc, 1965; Zajonc, 
Heingartner, & Herman, 1969). Whereas the salience of any individual (e.g., colleagues or 
subordinates) may place some level of normative or performance pressure on an individual 
holding formal authority, managers should be uniquely affected by the salience of a 
subordinate. 
In additional to general social normative pressure, the salience of a subordinate can also 
present a social identity threat to managers. Social identity threat is the idea that a social 
identity may be at risk of devaluation in a given context (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 
2002). Whereas managers may lose some general social standing by engaging in self-
interested (nonnormative) behavior when a nonsubordinate is salient (Campbell, 1975), 
engaging in self-interested behavior, when a subordinate is salient, should result in both 
the loss of general social standing and potentially put their identity as a leader in jeopardy 
(Steele et al., 2002). Because a leader’s power and influence are dependent on their 
followers (Uhl-Bien & Pillai, 2007), engaging in self-interested behavior could violate a 




manager’s power and influence in an organization (Hogg, 2001b).  
Based on this logic, I predict that managers will exhibit less self-interested behavior 
when a subordinate is salient than when any other individual (e.g., a colleague) is salient 
because a subordinate’s evaluation of a manager has greater potential consequences in 
terms of a manager’s identity and ability to effectively influence their subordinates. Based 
on this rationale, I make the following hypothesis: 
H1b — There is an decrease in the self-interested behavior of a manager when a 
subordinate is salient as compared to when a colleague is salient. 
 
Formal Authority, Subordinate’s Power, and Self-Interested Behavior 
Whereas the effects of role orientations (Carsten et al., 2010; Howell & Shamir, 2005; 
Kohles, Bligh, & Carsten, 2012), implicitly held beliefs (Sy, 2010), and follower behaviors 
(Carsten et al., 2010;) have been shown to affect leaders’ attitudes and behaviors, research 
has yet to explore other followers’ characteristics that may shape leaders’ attitudes and 
behaviors. The present research explores an as yet unexplored characteristic of followers 
— subordinates’ power — and the effect a subordinate’s power has on the behaviors of a 
manager. In the leadership literature, increasing a leader’s power has been shown to affect 
the ways leaders and followers interact (Antonakis & Atwater, 2002). Formal authority 
affects the way followers and leaders perceive their power (Bogardus, 1927). Formal 
authority generally gives leaders more power through increased access and control over 
group resources (Magee & Galinsky, 2008) and more voice in decision-making processes 
(Aghion & Tirole, 1997). In leaders, increased power is linked to the devaluation of 




followers (Magee & Smith, 2013), and an asymmetric perceived social distance with 
followers (Inesi, Gruenfeld, & Galinsky, 2012; Lammers, Stoker, & Stapel, 2009; Smith 
& Trope, 2006). The consequences of power on leaders’ perceptions of their followers have 
two implications on leaders’ behaviors. 
First, individuals use assessments of power to evaluate how much attention to give to 
each member of a group (Fiske, 1993). As the relative power of high-power individuals 
(e.g., leaders) increases, high-power individuals show a decreased motivation to affiliate 
with or attend to the needs of others (e.g., followers; Copeland, 1994). Instead, high power 
individuals affiliate with and attend to the needs of those who are closer or equal to 
themselves in regards to power (Van Kleef et al., 2008). In extreme cases, high power can 
cause individuals to evaluate those with less power as having nothing of interest to offer to 
those with power (Zander, Cohen, & Stotland, 1959). Additionally, high-power individuals 
often make efforts to behave in ways that distance themselves from the influence of those 
low in power because of a perceived lack of instrumental value (Earle, Giuliano, & Archer, 
1983; Inesi et al., 2012; Slobin, Miller, & Porter, 1968).  
Second, increased power can influence how high-power individuals perceive their 
interactions with low-power individuals. High power can cause individuals to perceive 
themselves as dissimilar to those with less power (Ledgerwood & Chaiken, 2007; Magee 
& Smith, 2013). These perceived dissimilarities can lead to a decreased need to resolve 
any self–other  discrepancies with low-power individuals (Sinclair & Dowdy, 2005). High-
power individuals also tend to disengage from low-power individuals (Magee & Smith, 
2013) and give low-power individuals’ views and opinions less consideration (Antonakis 




Whereas there is plentiful research that explores how altering the power of a leader 
affects a leader’s behavior, little research explores how altering the power of a subordinate 
affects a leader’s behavior. Because nonprototypical (e.g., self-interested) leaders are 
generally negatively evaluated by followers (Maner & Mead, 2010), managers should 
avoid explicit self-interested behavior because the self-interested behavior of a manager 
would most likely result in a self–other discrepancy between managers and subordinates 
(Davis & Rusbult, 2001). High-power individuals are more sensitive to the self–other 
discrepancies involving other high-power individuals (Magee & Smith, 2013). The more 
similarly two individuals assess their power in a group (i.e., managers and subordinates 
with higher power), the greater the social threat that a subordinate may pose to a manager 
(Mead & Maner, 2012). By definition, high-power subordinates will be group members 
that have a greater control over resources (e.g., knowledge, access to resources, network, 
etc.), but they are still subject to the formal power of their manager (Magee & Galinsky, 
2008). Thus, the power of the manager stays constant, but the manager’s perceptions of his 
or her own power may be altered—even though the power of the manager and the power 
of the subordinate are technically orthogonal.  
A manager’s and a subordinate’s power are technically orthogonal because as a 
manager’s or a subordinates power changes, the other individual’s power is not necessarily 
altered. For example, if a manager receives a raise or new responsibilities (two examples 
of increased power), the power of their subordinate could remain constant. Additionally, if 
a subordinate receives a raise or new responsibilities, the power of their manager could 
also remain constant. The reason I posit that they are “technically” orthogonal is because 




power relative to one another could change.  
Managers should perceive higher power subordinates as more similar to themselves 
(Antonakis & Atwater, 2002) and more integral to a groups’ performance (Zander et al., 
1959). Managers should care more about maintaining a prototypical image with high-
power subordinates because managers should perceive a greater degree of dependence on 
high-power subordinates (Copeland, 1994; Van Kleef et al., 2008), and wish to preserve 
their influence over valued members of a group (Zander et al., 1959). I predict that 
managers will exhibit less self-interested behavior when a high-power subordinate is 
salient because managers will perceive that high-power subordinates are less dependent 
than lower-power subordinates. This reduction in perceived dependency between 
subordinates and managers will motivate managers to avoid self-interested behavior 
because acting out of self-interest in front of high-power subordinates would violate a 
subordinate’s prototype of a manager and potentially compromise their influence over that 
highly valued subordinate. Based on this rationale, I make the following hypothesis: 
H2 — There is a negative relationship between the power of a subordinate and the 
self-interested behavior of a manager. 
 
Formal Authority, Subordinate’s Power, and Granting Behavior 
Beyond a manager’s desire to preserve their influence when a high-power subordinate 
is salient, a manager may also be more susceptible to granting requests to a high-power 
subordinate. I use DeRue and Ashford’s (2010) definition of granting behavior as the 
bestowal of a claim tied to the identity of another (e.g., a follower choosing to follow a 




maintain influence over that follower (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Shamir, 1995). When 
subordinates have higher power, leaders engage in more helping behaviors to maintain 
their influence over their subordinates (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; 
Korchmaros & Kenny, 2006). Leaders may even accommodate those perceived as similar 
in power even if the requests are ethically questionable or unfair (Gino & Galinsky, 2012). 
I predict that managers will be more inclined to grant requests from high-power 
subordinates. These subordinates will have increased influence because managers both 
value and want to maintain their influence over high-power subordinates. Based on this 
rationale, I make the following hypothesis: 
H3 — There is a positive relationship between the power of a subordinate and the 
granting behavior of a manager. 
 
Necessity of a Leader: Substitutes for Leadership and 
Leaders’ Self-Efficacy 
Whereas most contemporary models of leadership recognize that certain leadership 
styles are inappropriate or unnecessary in specific contexts (Hackman & Wageman, 2007), 
most still maintain the assumption that situations will always benefit from a leader so long 
as the leader engages in “appropriate leader behaviors” (Avolio et al., 2009; Meindl, 
Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985; Morgeson et al., 2009; Yukl, 2012). This assumption about the 
inherent benefit of having a leader ignores instances where the leader is unnecessary or 
irrelevant. In other words, organizations often put managers in a position where they are 
expected to “lead,” even when their efforts to “lead” may hinder the performance of their 




existing bodies of research: leader’s self-efficacy and substitutes for leadership as 
perceived by the leader. This is not to say that these two constructs (and leader’s necessity) 
can only exist as perceptions of a leader, but for purposes of this paper, I am only exploring 
a leader’s perception of substitutes for leadership and leader self-efficacy. Each body of 
research provides an integral component that informs how necessary leadership will be 
defined and subsequently operationalized in the present research.  
 
Substitutes for Leadership 
Path-goal theory was one of the first leadership theories to show that leaders’ actions 
may be redundant in certain situations (House, 1971). Specifically, when both the goals of 
a group and the path to those goals are clear, a leader’s attempts to clarify goals or paths 
can be perceived as unnecessary by followers (House & Mitchell, 1974). But path-goal 
theory only posits that redundant leadership will lead to dissatisfaction among subordinates 
and stops short of linking redundant leadership to negative performance outcomes of 
subordinates (Evans, 1996; House, 1996; House & Mitchell, 1974; Schriesheim & Von 
Glinow, 1977). The consideration-initiating structure literature takes the implications of 
redundant leadership one step further. The consideration-initiating structure literature 
posits that if subordinates perceive a leader as redundant, subordinate satisfaction, 
motivation, performance, and acceptance of the leader should all decrease (House & 
Dessler, 1974; Kerr, Schriesheim, Murphy, & Stogdill, 1974). However, neither path-goal 
theory nor the consideration-initiating structure literatures hypothesize situations where 
leadership is irrelevant or unnecessary. 




can be neutralized. Taxonomies of nonleader substitutes for leadership (Miner, 1975) and 
reviews pointing out when leaders provide value to groups (Hunt, Osborn, & Larson, 1975; 
Kerr et al., 1974) resulted in a body of research that explores external substitutes for 
leadership. Substitutes for leadership are defined as organizational factors that affect a 
leader’s behaviors and ability to lead (Kerr & Jermier, 1978). Three domains of substitutes 
for a leader have been identified: characteristics of subordinates (e.g., ability, knowledge, 
or dispositional traits), characteristics of the task (e.g., simplicity, variability, or 
intrinsically satisfying), and characteristics of the organization (e.g., flexibility, 
cohesiveness, or formalization; Kerr & Jermier, 1978). Kerr and Jermier (1978) posit that 
if one or more of these substitutes are salient, a leader’s influence can be neutralized. For 
instance, when a task is too simple or easy (i.e., characteristics of the task), the task itself 
is a substitute for leadership. In other words, if a task is too simple, there should be little 
need for a leader and the simplicity of the task should neutralize any attempts to lead. 
Furthermore, the authors state that, in contexts where substitutes for leadership are salient 
to a leader, attempts to lead may be perceived by subordinates as unnecessary or hurt 
organizational outcomes. 
The findings from the substitutes for leadership literature led to a small movement that 
briefly challenged the over-romanticism of leaders in organizations (Meindl et al., 1985). 
Whereas Meindl and colleagues (1985) started a conversation about the pitfalls of the 
leadership literature’s tendency to over-romanticize conceptions of leaders, one could 
make the argument that the leadership literature in general has come full circle and has 
again become overly romanticized (Avolio et al., 2009; Hackman & Wageman, 2004, 




substitutes for leadership has involved both instances where the substitutes work in tandem 
with leaders to enhance group outcomes (Xu, Wu, & Cavusgil, 2013) and instances where 
the substitutes render leadership irrelevant (Podsakoff, Niehoff, MacKenzie, & Williams, 
1993). This duality raises the question - does a perceived substitute for a leader render a 
leader unnecessary? I argue that the salience of substitutes for a leader is not sufficient to 
determine the self-perceived necessity of a leader, but that a leader’s self-efficacy must 
also be assessed.  
 
Leaders’ Self-Efficacy 
Wood and Bandura (1989) define self-efficacy as an individual’s beliefs in their ability 
to engage the motivation, cognitive resources, and actions needed to meet the demands of 
a situation. Leader’s self-efficacy is a particular form of self-efficacy that applies to one’s 
self-assessment of skills, knowledge, and abilities that are necessary to lead others in an 
organization (Hannah, Avolio, Luthans, & Harms, 2008). There is a wide body of literature 
regarding leader’s self-efficacy, both in regards to theory development (Gist, 1989; Hannah 
et al., 2008; Hollenbeck & Hall, 2004; Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996; Luthans & Peterson, 
2002; Popper, Amit, Gal, Mishkal-Sinai, & Lisak, 2004; Rafferty & Griffin, 2006) and 
empirical studies (Chemers, Watson, & May, 2000; Finn, Mason, & Bradley, 2007; 
Hannah, 2006; Hendricks & Payne, 2007; Paglis & Green, 2002; Semadar, Robins, & 
Ferris, 2006; Taggar & Seijts, 2003). Leaders with high leader self-efficacy have been 
shown to have an increased motivation to influence others (Chan & Drasgow, 2001; 
Hendricks & Payne, 2007), an increased desire to assume formal positions of authority 




(Robertson & Sadri, 1993; Semadar et al., 2006). Leaders with low leader self-efficacy 
show an increased vulnerability to external pressures (Bandura & Locke, 2003), less 
confidence in their decisions (Howell & Shamir, 2005), and a decreased internal locus of 
control (Paglis & Green, 2002). Managers who perceive themselves as having the 
necessary skills, knowledge, and ability to be a manager (i.e., high leader self-efficacy) 
should demonstrate more confidence in their decisions and more security in their position 
as a manager. Managers who perceive themselves as lacking the necessary skills, 
knowledge, and ability to be a manager (i.e., low leader self-efficacy) should demonstrate 
increased insecurity about their position as a manager and show more concern for external 
assessments (e.g., subordinates). Similar to substitutes for leadership, leader’s self-efficacy 
begs the questions — what if a manager lacks self-efficacy but no leader substitutes are 
perceived? Additionally, what if a manager has high self-efficacy but many alternatives to 
the manager are salient? 
 
Necessity of a Leader 
Bandura (1997) suggests that self-efficacy, in general, should be explored within task 
and contextual bounds. In the domain of leader’s self-efficacy, the vast majority of research 
explores generalized leader’s self-efficacy and ignores the task and contextual bounds 
advocated by Bandura (Hannah et al., 2008). Theory in regards to substitutes for leadership 
is similarly limited. The substitute for leadership literature has focused exclusively on 
external alternatives to a leader and has largely ignored a leader’s — perceived or actual 
— knowledge, skills, and abilities (Kerr & Jermier, 1978; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & 




not they are needed for a given task. Most research explores leadership under the 
assumption that a leader is needed in some way even though it is intuitive that managerial 
intervention would not be needed, or might even be detrimental, in certain tasks. To better 
understand the effects of a leader’s self-perceived necessity, I must first understand how a 
leader’s necessity is determined.  
To determine a leader’s necessity — defined as the need of a leader in a given context 
— I argue that both a leader’s self-efficacy and any perceived substitutes for leadership 
must be assessed. Leaders’ necessity is not necessarily a new construct, but a combination 
of two existing constructs that represent the two vital dimensions in determining the need 
for a leader. If a manager has only leader’s self-efficacy or lacks perceived substitutes for 
their leadership, the determination of a manager’s necessity and subsequent group 
outcomes could be positive (Xu et al., 2013) or negative. For example, if a manager has 
high self-efficacy but external substitutes for leadership are salient, the confidence and 
security gained from high leader’s self-efficacy could enable a manager to capitalize on the 
substitutes while maintaining their identity as a leader. Alternately, if a manager has low 
self-efficacy and no substitutes for leadership are salient, the vulnerability and lack of 
confidence resulting from low leader self-efficacy could be mitigated by the need for a 
leader and the lack of viable alternatives.  
However, if a manager has high leader self-efficacy and no substitutes for leadership 
are salient to the manager (i.e., a necessary leader), the confidence and security gained from 
high leader self-efficacy may be reinforced by the lack of viable leader alternatives. 
Alternately, if a manager has low leader self-efficacy and external substitutes for leadership 




confidence resulting from low leader self-efficacy should be magnified by the salience of 
alternatives that threaten the leader’s identity and organizational role. In summary, both 
external substitutes for leadership and a leader’s self-efficacy should be needed to 
determine the self-perceived necessity of a manager’s organizational role.  
 
Necessity of a Leader and Self-Interested Behavior 
Even when perceived as unnecessary, a manager still has the power associated with 
his or her formal position in an organization (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). The necessity of 
a leader either reinforces or attenuates the justifiability of the formal authority granted to a 
manager (Hannah et al., 2008; Podsakoff et al., 1996a). Because self-interested behavior is 
generally perceived as nonprototypical of an effective leader (Maner & Mead, 2010; 
Morgeson et al., 2009), engaging in self-interested behavior could threaten a manager’s 
identity as a leader and threaten their influence in a group by violating subordinates’ 
perceptions of necessary managerial behavior. In general, identity threats cause individuals 
to defensively protect their identity and engage in behaviors that preserve their role in an 
organization (Fast & Chen, 2009). Necessity can serve as a source of legitimacy 
(Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Gioia & Sims, 1985) and either insulate or increase sensitivity 
and perceived vulnerability to identity threats (Bandura & Locke, 2003; Kerr & Jermier, 
1978). I predict that when a manager is self-perceived as necessary, that manager will be 
more motivated to engage in self-interested behavior because there will be a decrease in 
the perceived threat to the manager’s organizational role and identity as a leader. 
Furthermore, I predict that when a manager is self-perceived as unnecessary, that manager 




the perceived threat to the manager’s identity as a leader and an increase in the motivation 
to be perceived as a prototypical manager to maintain their influence in a group or 
organization. Based on this rationale, I make the following hypothesis: 
H4 — There is a positive relationship between a manager’s self-perceived necessity 
and the self-interested behavior of a manager. 
 
Necessity of a Leader and Granting Behaviors 
Subordinates have an inherent expectation for some level of dependency on their 
managers (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), and subordinates also expect to make requests of 
their managers (Emerson, 1962). Prototypical managers are expected to serve as a form of 
gatekeeper who arbitrates access to their own expanded pool of group resources (Hackman, 
1987; Shea & Guzzo, 1987). A subordinate can make a claim by making a request of their 
manager. A manager must determine if they will grant or deny the request of their follower. 
If a subordinate’s request (a form of a claim) is granted, the roles of the manager and the 
subordinate are both reinforced. If a subordinate’s request (claim) is denied, the roles of 
the manager and the subordinate could be mutually compromised depending on the 
strength of their respective role identifications because of a potential perceived violation 
of normative expectations (DeRue & Ashford, 2010). 
Managers self-perceived as unnecessary are likely to feel threatened by the perception 
that they are unable to fulfill the role expectations of a leader (Cho & Fast, 2012; Fast & 
Chen, 2009). This role threat can stem from the fear of being assessed by others (e.g., 
subordinates) and found lacking the competencies expected of one holding a formal 




threatened, they either seek to rationally justify their identity or engage in behaviors that 
protect and justify their social identity (Steele et al., 2002). In regards to granting behaviors, 
managers may find themselves in a position where a subordinate makes a request or 
engages in behaviors that serve the subordinate irrespective of the common good 
(Hoogervorst, De Cremer, & van Dijke, 2010). If a manager’s role identity is insecure, the 
manager may be more likely to grant these requests of their subordinate in an effort to 
preserve their influence over that subordinate. If a manager feels secure in their role 
identity, the manager may be more likely to resist these requests of their subordinates 
because the manager has increased confidence that their influence over their subordinates 
will be maintained despite denying a subordinate’s request. I predict that when a manager 
is self-perceived as necessary, that manager will be less likely to grant subordinates’ 
requests because there will be a decrease in the self-perceived threat to the manager’s role 
identity and an increase in confidence of maintaining their role despite resisting the 
influence o-f their subordinate. Furthermore, I predict that when a manager is self-
perceived as unnecessary, that manager will be more likely to accede to their subordinates’ 
requests because there will be an increase in the self-perceived threat to the manager’s role 
identity and a reduced confidence of maintaining their role if they choose not to be 
influenced by their subordinate. Based on this rationale, I make the following hypothesis: 
H5 — There is a negative relationship between a manager’s self-perceived 







Necessity of a Leader, Subordinate’s Power, and Managers’ 
Self-Interested Behaviors 
As compared to those with less power, those with more power are particularly sensitive 
to threats to their power (Maner & Mead, 2010), and followers represent a very specific 
threat to a leader because a leader’s power is largely contingent on a follower’s willingness 
to be influenced (DeRue & Ashford, 2010; Hogg, 2010). A subordinate’s power should 
interact with a manager’s self-perception of necessity by affecting both a manager’s 
perceived dependency on their subordinate and the level of identity threat a manager feels 
from their subordinates. If a manager is self-perceived as necessary, the manager should 
perceive his or her position and identity as a manager as more secure because the manager 
assumes that he or she is integral to the success of the organization (Bandura & Locke, 
2003; Kerr & Jermier, 1978). If a subordinate has less power, the manager should feel less 
dependent on that subordinate (Copeland, 1994; Van Kleef et al., 2008; Zander et al., 
1959). Altogether, the increased power of a subordinate and self-perceived necessity 
should work together to insulate a manager from their subordinate and create an 
environment where a manager feels both less threatened by negative assessments and more 
confident of maintaining power in spite of their behavior. In other words, if a manager feels 
needed and assesses their subordinate as less powerful, they should be more likely to 
engage in self-interested behavior because they expect the consequences of not behaving 
like prototypical manager to be attenuated.  
Alternately, if a manager is self-perceived as unnecessary, the manager should perceive 
their position and identity as a manager as less secure because the manager is not integral 




subordinate has high power, the manager should feel closer to that subordinate (Copeland, 
1994; Van Kleef et al., 2008; Zander et al., 1959). Altogether, the increased power of a 
subordinate and a self-perceived lack of necessity should work together to sensitize a 
manager to their subordinate’s needs and create an environment where a manager feels 
both more threatened by negative assessments and more aware of non-prototypical leaders’ 
behavior (see Figure 3 for a graphic representation of the interaction). In other words, if a 
manager does not feel needed and a higher power subordinate is salient, the manager should 
be less likely to engage in self-interested behavior because the consequences of being 
perceived as a nonprototypical leader are magnified. 
At face value, it may seem plausible that a subordinate’s power could also affect a 
leader’s self-perceived necessity. I do not believe this is the case for two reasons. First, 
subordinates are subject to the power of their manager regardless of their own level of 
power. In theory, a manager’s power subsumes the power of all their subordinates. In other 
words, a manager should have the control over their employees’ pay, ability to influence 
others in the organization, and even the ability terminate their employment. Desire to keep 
a higher power employee may change, but one subordinate’s power should not mitigate a  
 
 
Necessary Manager Unnecessary Manager 
High Subordinate Power - - - 
Low Subordinate Power + - 
 
Figure 3. Graphic representation of the predicted effect of leader’s self-perceived 
necessity and subordinate’s power on the self-interested behavior of a manager. Signs 




manager’s ability to lead. Second, a subordinate’s power should have no connection to the 
need for someone to lead. One might assume that higher power subordinates have more 
skills, abilities, or network ties, but self-perceived necessity is determined by the need for 
someone to coordinate and lead in a given context. In most cases, I do not believe that 
higher power subordinates are seen as a proxy or replacement for their manager. Higher 
power subordinates may be seen as more valuable or potentially even harder to influence, 
but I do not believe there is a direct connection between subordinate’s power and a leader’s 
self-perceived necessity. Based on this rationale, I make the following hypothesis: 
H6 — The negative relationship between the power of a subordinate and the self-
interested behavior of a manager is moderated by a manager’s self-perceived 
necessity. 
 
Necessity of a Leader, Subordinate’s Power, and Granting Behavior 
The power of a subordinate and the self-perception of a leader’s necessity should also 
interact to affect a manager’s granting behavior. Because necessary managers with low-
power followers should feel secure, confident, and insulated from their subordinates, 
managers should expend less effort to understand the needs of their subordinate and ascribe 
less value to maintaining the influence over their subordinate. Accordingly, necessary 
managers with low-power subordinates should be significantly less willing to grant 
requests from their subordinates (see Figure 4 for a graphic representation of the 
interaction).  
Alternately, unnecessary managers with high-power followers should feel less secure, 





Necessary Manager Unnecessary Manager 
High Subordinate Power + ++ 
Low Subordinate Power - + 
 
Figure 4. Graphic representation of the predicted effect of leader’s self-perceived 
necessity and subordinate’s power on the granting behavior of a manager. Signs reflect the 




managers with high-power followers should expend more effort to understand the needs of 
their subordinates and ascribe more value to maintaining their influence over their 
subordinates. Accordingly, unnecessary managers with high-power subordinates should be 
significantly more willingly to grant the requests of their subordinates. Based on this 
rationale, I make the following hypothesis: 
H7 — The positive relationship between the power of a subordinate and the 




The present research tests these hypotheses through a series of experiments using 
different samples and design variations. First, I seek to show empirical evidence that the 
salience of a subordinate — as compared to the salience of a colleague or no one at all — 
attenuates the self-interested behavior of a manager and increases the influence of the 
subordinate. Next, I test to what degree the power of a subordinate differentially affects 




link between a manager’s self-perceived necessity and both self-interested and granting 
behavior. Finally, I empirically test the full model by incorporating the interaction of both 
a subordinate’s power and a leader’s self-perceived necessity on a manager’s behaviors.





The theory developed here “reverses the lens” by depicting followers as agents of 
influence, and leaders as agents to be influenced. Seven experiments were conducted to 
explore the theoretical constructs discussed above. For clarity, I included a table (see Table 
1) and discussion of variables that summarizes the definition and operationalization of each 
of the constructs of interest. Additionally, I include information regarding any adaptations 
(if applicable) of operationalizations from existing work. 
 
Discussion of Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Self-Interested Behavior 
Self-interested behavior is defined as actions that benefit the self, irrespective of the 
common good (Miller, 1999). In this study, self-interested behavior is measured in two 
ways. First, I assess the differential allocation captured using the ultimate bargaining game 
(described in detail in Study 1). One expression of the influence followers have on leaders 
is how individuals in positions of formal authority allocate resources. In my design, 
individuals have the opportunity to allocate themselves a greater amount of resources at 




Table 1: List of Dependent Variables with Operationalizations. 
Theoretical Construct Definition Operationalization Adaptation 
Dependent Variables 
Self-interested behavior 
(Studies 1-2 & 4-6) 
Actions that benefit 
the self, irrespective 
of the common good 
(Miller, 1999) 
Self-interested behavior is 
directly measured assessing 
allocation choices (Güth, 
Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 
1982) and indirectly by 
assessing deceptive 
behaviors of allocators 
(Boles, Croson, & 
Murnighan, 2000). 
Both measures of self-
interest employ the 
UBG which is broadly 
used in the literature. 
Granting behavior 
(Studies 4-6) 
The bestowal of a 
claim tied to the 
identity of another 
(e.g. follower; DeRue 
& Ashford, 2010) 
This variable measures the 
granting behavior of a leader 
by measuring the willingness 
of a manager to alter the 
allocation decisions based on 
a request from a subordinate. 
This measure was 
adapted from DeRue 
and Ashford’s (2010) 
description of granting 
behavior and is also 
treated as an 
independent variable in 
Study 2 by 
manipulating whether a 
subordinate makes a 




The need for 
leadership in a given 
context (Hackman & 
Wageman, 2007) 
This variable measures 
leader’s self-perceived 
necessity by asking 
participants a single self-
report question regarding the 
need for a leader 
This is measured as a 
dependent variable in 
Study 3 to empirically 




differential allocation of resources as a direct indicator of self-interested behavior on the 
part of the manager. 
Second, I assess self-interested behavior by measuring the allocator’s willingness to 
deceive a recipient in the ultimatum bargaining game (Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000). 
I measure the binary choice of whether or not an allocator chooses to lie to a recipient. 
Admittedly, deception is a broad and rich body of literature, and deception does not 
inherently mean an individual is being self-interested. However, for purposes of my design, 
the only obvious reason an individual would have to deceive another is to obfuscate a self-





Granting Behavior  
DeRue and Ashford (2010) define granting behavior as the bestowal of a claim tied to 
the identity of another (e.g., a follower agreeing to follow a leader). In my design, a 
hypothetical subordinate makes a request of their manager regarding the allocation in the 
ultimatum bargaining game. The request to allocate more money to a recipient acts as a 
claim, and the roles of subordinate and manager act as the identity cues. The granting of 
the request is measured by assessing the differential amount of money allocated. I interpret 
increased allocation to the recipient as increased granting behavior. 1 
 
Leader’s Necessity 
Leader’s necessity is defined as the need of leadership in a given context (Hackman & 
Wageman, 2007). Leader’s necessity is measured by asking participants a single self-report 
question regarding the need for a leader. Leader’s necessity is measured as a dependent 
variable in Study 3 in order to empirically establish whether the constructs of substitutes 
for leadership and leader’s self-efficacy are representative of a leader’s necessity before 




Subordinate’s power is defined as a subordinate’s asymmetrical control of resources 
(Magee & Galinsky, 2008). The resources in question could involve a wide array of items 
including pay, decision control, influence, physical dominance, etc. In my design, I focus 
                                                          
1 Granting behavior is also manipulated in Study 2 to ensure it is not significantly correlated with self-




on two resources that I felt were appropriate for manipulating the power of a subordinate: 
pay and organizational influence. Whereas other types of resources could have also been 
incorporated, I felt other resources were either not as organizationally relevant (e.g., 
physical dominance) or not as relevant to subordinates (e.g., decision control). I adapted 
my manipulation of subordinate power from descriptions of pay and influence found in 




Leader’s necessity is a combination of the constructs of substitutes for leadership and 
leader’s self-efficacy. As argued above, I believe both constructs are required to determine 
the necessity of a leader. Leader’s necessity will be manipulated by either both the lack of 
perceived substitutes for leadership and the presence of leader self-efficacy or both the 
presence of perceived substitutes for leadership and the lack of leader’s self-efficacy (see 
Study 4 for the specific manipulation). I empirically confirm that combining the constructs 
of substitutes for leadership and leader’s self-efficacy is representative of a leader’s 
necessity (see Study 3) before using the leader’s necessity in the studies that follow.  
 
Substitutes for Leadership 
Substitutes for leadership are defined as organizational factors that affect a leader’s 
behaviors and ability to lead (Kerr & Jermier, 1978). In my design, participants are given 
information regarding the need for a manager to effectively perform the task (see Study 3 




Table 2: List of Independent Variables with Operationalizations 
Theoretical Construct Definition Operationalization Adaptation 
Independent Variables 
Subordinate’s Power 
(Studies 1-2 & 4-6) 
[A subordinate’s] 
asymmetrical control 
of resources (Magee 
& Galinsky, 2008) 
Manipulating descriptions of 
pay (high/low) and influence 
(high/low) (Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008) 
This manipulation was 
adapted from 
descriptions of power 
found in Magee & 
Galinsky (2008). 
Substitutes for leadership 
(Study 3) 
Organizational 
factors that affect a 
leader’s behaviors 
and ability to lead 
(Kerr & Jermier, 
1978) 
Manipulating information 
regarding the perceived need 
for a leader (substitutes 
present/not present) in a 
given context (Kerr & 
Jermier, 1978) 
This manipulation uses 
the manipulation of the 
presence or absence of 
perceived substitutes 
for leadership found in 




A particular form of 
self-efficacy that 
applies to one’s self-
assessment of skills, 
knowledge and 
abilities that are 
necessary to lead 
others in an 
organization (Hannah 
et al., 2008) 
Manipulating information 
regarding the participants 
(high/low) ability to lead 
(Durham et al., 1997) 
This manipulation was 
adapted from 
descriptions of leader’s 
self-efficacy found in 




The need for 
leadership in a given 
context (Hackman & 
Wageman, 2007) 
Manipulating both 
information regarding the 
perceived need for a leader 
(substitutes present/not 
present) in a given context 
and information regarding 
the participants (high/low) 
ability to lead 
This manipulation is an 
amalgamation of both 
perceived substitutes 
for leadership and 
leader’s self-efficacy. 
Also, measured as a 





potential substitutes, but at its root, substitutes for leadership are centrally about whether 
something else (person, task, or contextual factor) exists that could supplant the need for a 
leader. Similar to Kerr and Jermier, descriptions of the existing substitutes for leadership 
should alter participants’ perceptions of their necessity as a manager. 
 
Leader’s Self-Efficacy  
Leader’s self-efficacy is defined as a particular form of self-efficacy that applies to 




in an organization (Hannah et al., 2008). In my design, participants will be told 
information regarding the reason they were selected for the manager role (see Study 3 for 
the specific manipulation). Even though individuals have a wide range of trait-based self-
efficacy, Hannah and colleagues (2008) propose that assessments of ability should affect 
beliefs about leadership ability. In keeping with previous research, the assessments, 
although false, should effectively alter participants’ perceptions of self-efficacy as a 
leader for this task. 
 
Research Methodology 
Study 1: Salience of Others and Relational Distance 
The first study tests hypotheses 1a and 1b. Hypothesis 1a predicts that as compared to 
managers with no one salient, there is a negative relationship between the salience of a 
subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a manager. Hypothesis 1b predicts that as 
compared to the salience of a colleague, there is a negative relationship between the 
salience of a subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a manager. In this study, I use 
an adapted version of the ultimatum bargaining game and manipulate and examine how the 
salience of a subordinate affects the allocating behaviors of a manager.  
There exist two significant potential alternative explanations regarding these 
hypotheses that I felt needed to be addressed within the design of Study 1: Relational 
Distance and Authority. It is plausible (but not expected) that a manager may alter their 
behavior based on their relational distance to a salient individual in their organization (e.g., 
levels of hierarchy between individuals). Also, it is plausible (but not expected) that a lack 




hypothesized (e.g., someone else’s subordinate). To preemptively address these alternative 
explanations while testing the first hypotheses, both authority and relational closeness were 
manipulated and explored in this study. 
 
Participants  
Based on the results from an a priori power analysis with a power level of .80, an alpha 
probability of .05, and an effect size estimate of .20, I estimated I would need a total of 500 
participants across five conditions to reach the desired level of power for this study. 
Participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk), an online 
participant database where online tasks are completed by participants in exchange for 
monetary compensation. As compared to samples of Western College students, mTurk 
samples are more diverse, and the data obtained from mTurk participants have been shown 
to be as reliable as data obtained using other collection methods in certain tasks amenable 
to online data collection (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Furthermore, mTurk 
usage is becoming widely accepted among top tier management and psychology journal 
publications. Online participants were used for the majority of my studies because I am 
focusing on the effects of the attributes of followers on leaders’ behaviors. Online studies 
allow for the study of the constructs of interest while avoiding interactions between leaders 
and followers that pose multiple confounds to specifically studying the effects of follower 
attributes. Future studies should then apply my findings to real groups with more complex 
interactions. 
I made an a priori decision to omit all participants who failed a comprehension check 




previous experience with a similar design, 620 participants were recruited, allotting for a 
24% comprehension check failure rate. Of the initial sample of 620 participants, 228 failed 
the comprehension check and their responses were removed from all further analyses. 
Whereas there was no significant difference in gender, ethnicity, education, or work 
experience between those who failed and those who passed the comprehension checks 
(both in this study and all that follow), it is possible that those who passed the 
comprehension checks may measure objectively higher on a personality dimension, such 
as conscientiousness, than those who failed. Conscientious individuals may take more care 
in reading the scenarios and be more likely to correctly answer the comprehension check 
questions.  Although I do not have any data regarding the conscientiousness of participants 
in these studies, a future study that explores the potential correlation between 
contentiousness and comprehension check failures in mTurk would be beneficial. 
Of the remaining 392 participants, 45% were female and the average age was 36.38 
(SD = 11.52). Participants were all U.S. Citizens over the age of 18 and had an average of 
13.26 years of full-time work experience (SD = 10.78). Ethnicities were self-reported as 
79% White, 8% Asian, 6% Black, 4% Hispanic/Latino, and 2% other. Thirteen percent had 
a post-graduate degree, 38% had a bachelor’s degree, 35% had some college experience, 
and 15% had a high school degree.  
 
Design and Procedure 
The hypotheses in this study were explored in a 2 (authority vs. no authority) x 2 
(distant vs. close) + 1 (control) design with managers’ allocation decisions and willingness 




dimensions of alternative explanations to hypotheses H1a and H1b. Both were manipulated 
in this study to establish that a direct subordinate has a unique influence over their manager 
as compared to others in the organizational hierarchy. After obtaining informed consent, 
participants were asked to engage in a brief decision making exercise—the ultimate 
bargaining game or UBG (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). Participants were 
informed that they were the allocators of a sum of money ($100,000) and were tasked with 
dividing that money between themselves and a hypothetical recipient. Participants were 
informed that in this scenario the recipient would then decide whether to accept or reject 
the proposed allocation of money. If the recipient accepted, the money would be divided 
as proposed, but if the recipient rejected the offer, both parties would receive nothing. 
Participants were also informed that they could receive a real monetary bonus that would 
be dependent on their allocation decision (see Appendix A for full wording of the study 
instructions). 
The authority and relational distance of the salient other were manipulated by 
embedding information in the scenario for the UBG. Participants were randomly placed 
into one of five conditions: authority over close subordinate, authority over distant 
subordinate, no authority over close colleague, no authority over another’s subordinate, 
or manager only. In all conditions, the participants were told that they were a manager at 
a company and were responsible for allocating a monetary bonus to themselves and another 
manager that was equally deserving of their bonus.  
In the authority over close subordinate condition, participants read that they were 
paired with one of their direct subordinates who would help with the logistics of the 




closely with this subordinate. In the authority over distant subordinate condition, 
participants read that they were paired with one of their subordinate’s subordinates who 
would help with the logistics of the allocation decision. In this condition, participants read 
that, in the past, they had never worked with their subordinate’s subordinate. In the no 
authority over close colleague condition, participants read that they were paired with one 
of their colleagues who would help with the logistics of the allocation decision. In this 
condition, participants read that, in the past, they had worked closely with this colleague. 
In the no authority over another’s subordinate condition, participants read that they were 
paired with one of their colleague’s subordinates who would help with the logistics of the 
allocation decision. In this condition, participants read that, in the past, they had never 
worked with this colleague’s subordinate. In the manager only/control condition, 
participants were given no additional information about others being salient for their 
deliberation. In all conditions, participants were told that, as managers, they were solely 
responsible for the allocation decision 
There were two adaptations in Study 1 that deviated from the original UBG. First, the 
present study allowed, but did not require, allocators to inform recipients of the total sum 
of money to be allocated (see Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000). This enabled 
participants to potentially misrepresent the total amount of money that was allocated to the 
recipients and allowed for another measure of self-interested behavior on the part of the 
allocator. Second, in an effort to increase the psychological realism of the study, the 
participants were informed that the way in which they allocated the pool of funds would 
directly affect a real monetary bonus that they could receive. Specifically, each $1,000 of 




themselves $100,000, the actual mTurk bonus would have been $1. If participants allocated 
themselves $50,000 and split the other $50,000 with the recipient, participants would have 
received a $0.50 bonus.  
In my own experience, many mTurk participants would take the whole monetary bonus 
for themselves if there were no ramifications for allocating too much money to themselves. 
For this reason, two brief pilot studies were run to avoid a potential ceiling affect caused 
by many participants simply taking the full amount possible. In the Pilot Study 1, 50 
participants were given a scenario with the same UBG scenario above, but asked to take 
the perspective of the salient other individual. Participants were asked at what point, if any, 
they would inform recipients of the actual size of the pool of funds that the allocator could 
have potentially misrepresented (see Appendix B for full wording of the study 
instructions). Sixty percent of participants indicated that they would tell the recipient the 
total pool of funds after the allocation.  
In the Pilot Study 2, 25 participants were asked to take the perspective of the recipient. 
These participants were asked what type of allocation would be acceptable and at what 
point they would reject the allocation (see Appendix C for full wording of the study 
instructions). The mean rejection amount was $35,400 (SD = 20,680) meaning that any 
amount under $35,400 would be rejected. Afterwards, they were also given information 
that the allocator may have misrepresented the size of the pool of funds and asked how any 
misrepresentations might change their acceptance of the allocation of money. The mean 
rejection amount after being lied too ($35,600) did not significantly differ from the original 
rejection amount.  




of resources were accepted or rejected based on the findings from the two pilot studies. In 
other words, if participants made the allocation too unreasonable, as determined by the 
pilot studies, they would lose out on a real-world monetary bonus. This created a situation 
where the participants were motivated to take as much as they are able, but not so much 
that they would lose out on the bonus entirely. After the allocators proposed the distribution 
of money and chose how to represent the total pool of money to recipients, participants 
completed a manipulation check—including a measure of the power of the salient other 
party (if applicable)—and a brief demographics survey. Within a week of survey 
completion, participants were informed if the distribution of funds was accepted, and the 
allocation bonus was paid if had they allotted no more than $64,600 to themselves. 
 
Measures 
Self-interested behavior. Self-interested behavior was measured in two ways. First, 
individuals had the opportunity to allocate themselves a greater amount of resources (any 
amount from $0 to $100,000) at the expense of other recipients (Güth, Schmittberger, & 
Schwarze, 1982). Because this is an individual bonus and the potential salient other 
receives no benefit from larger self-allocations, I interpreted a differential allocation of 
resources as a direct indicator of self-interested behavior on the part of the allocator. 
Second, allocators were given the opportunity to deceive recipients regarding the total 
pool of resources available in the ultimatum bargaining game (Boles, Croson, & 
Murnighan, 2000). A lie was any amount told to a recipient other than $100,000. I 
interpreted lying to a recipient as an indirect indicator of self-interested behavior.  




made the allocation decision?” with possible responses being 1 (no one), 2 (your 
subordinate’s subordinate), 3 (a direct subordinate), 4 (a colleague), or 5 (a colleague’s 




Manipulation check. To check the efficacy of the authority manipulation, participants 
were asked to rate their power relative to the salient other with potential responses ranging 
from 1 (no power) to 7 (a lot of power). Using a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
I dummy coded the independent variable authority as either 1 — authority or 0 — no 
authority. The response to the question regarding relative power was the dependent 
variable. Participants in the authority condition properly identified their relative power as 
higher (M = 3.83, SD = 1.25), and participants in the no authority condition properly 
identified their relative power as lower (M = 3.32, SD = 1.12). The two conditions were 
also significantly different from each other F(1, 272) = 12.624, p < .001, η2 = .045. These 
results indicate that the manipulation of authority was effective. 
To check the efficacy of the relational distance manipulation, participants were asked 
to rate the likability and sociability of the salient other with potential responses ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Likability and sociability were used as 
manipulation checks for relational distance because I viewed these constructs as the 
potential driving mechanism behind why relational distance could alter the relationship 
between a manager’s self-interested behavior and the salient of another. Whereas this 




test the facets of relational distance with which I was most concerned. Using a one-way 
ANOVA, I dummy coded the independent variable relational distance as either 1 — close 
or 0 — distant. An aggregate of the responses to the questions regarding the subordinate’s 
likability and sociability was the dependent variable. Participants in the close condition 
properly identified the salient other as higher in likability and sociability (M = 4.38, SD = 
1.12), and participants in the distant condition properly identified the salient other as lower 
in likability and sociability (M = 4.02, SD = 1.13). The two conditions were also 
significantly different from each other F(1, 272) = 6.741, p = .010, η2 = .024 These results 
indicate that the manipulation of relational distance was effective. 
Study results. The dummy codes from the manipulation check were used to create the 
two dimensions of each independent variable: authority (1 = authority, 0 = no authority) 
and relational distance (1 = close, 0 = distant). To test the significance of each dimension 
and their interaction, I used a 2 x 2 ANOVA where authority and relational distance were 
the independent variables and allocation to self and willingness to lie were the dependent 
variables, respectively. As predicted, participants with a subordinate present allocated less 
to themselves (M = $55,543, SD = $9,939) than participants with someone outside their 
authority salient (M = $59,729, SD = $15,683), F(1, 392) = 8.77, p = .003, η2 = .022, and 
participants with subordinates salient lied marginally less to recipients (M = .267, SD = 
.44) than participants with someone outside their authority salient (M = .332, SD = .47), 
F(1, 389) = 2.789, p = .098, η2 = .007. Also as predicted, relational distance was not a 
significant predictor of participant’s allocations, F(1, 392) = 2.282, p = .132, η2 = .006 nor 









To directly test Hypothesis 1a — that as compared to managers with no one salient, 
there is a negative relationship between the salience of a subordinate and the self-interested 
behavior of a manager — I dummy coded a role salience variable where 1 = close authority 
(subordinate) and 0 = no one salient (control). I conducted one-way ANOVA’s where role 
salience was the independent variable and allocation to self and lying were the dependent 
variables, respectively. Participants with a close subordinate salient allocated less to 
themselves (M = $54,500, SD = $9,780) than participants with no one salient (M = $61,887, 
SD = $15,850), F(1, 194) = 13.454, p < .001, η2 = .066. Participants with a close 
subordinate salient also lied less to recipients (M = .27, SD = .45) than participants with no 
one salient (M = .46, SD = .50), F(1, 193) = 7.074, p = .008, η2 = .036. These results 
support Hypothesis 1 and suggest that the salience of a subordinate reduces self-interested 
allocations and reduces a participant’s likelihood of lying to a recipient.  
To directly test Hypothesis 1b — that as compared to the salience of a colleague, there 
is a negative relationship between the salience of a subordinate and the self-interested 
behavior of a manager — I dummy coded a role type variable where 1 = close authority 
(subordinate) and 0 = close no authority (colleague). I again conducted one-way ANOVA’s 
where role type was the independent variable and allocation to self and lying were the 
dependent variables, respectively. Participants with a close subordinate salient allocated 
M SD (1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Authority .51 .50 ––
(2) Relational Distance .52 .50 .08 ––
(3) Allocation (Self) $57,538 $13,202 -.17** -.09 ––
(4) Lie to Recipient .30 .46 -.07 -.06 .67** ––
Note.  N = 392. Authority is coded 1 = authority, 0 = no authority. Relational Distance is coded 1 = close, 0 = distant




less to themselves (M = $54,500, SD = $9,780) than participants with a close colleague 
salient (M = $58,828, SD = $15,059), F(1, 142) = 4.258, p = .041, η2 = .03. The type of 
salient other did not significantly affect a participant’s willingness to lie to a recipient. 
These results mostly support Hypothesis 1b and again suggest that the salience of a 
subordinate, as compared to the salience of a colleague, reduces self-interested allocations. 
See Table 4 for all means and standard deviations by condition. See Table 5 and 6 for 2 x 
2 ANOVA tables. 
 
Discussion  
Results from Study 1 support Hypotheses 1A and 1B by demonstrating that the salience 
of a subordinate has a unique influence over managers’ self-interested behavior as 
compared to the salience of others in the organizational hierarchy or the lack of anyone 
salient. In all future studies, I will only be exploring the salience of a subordinate (as 
opposed to others in the organizational hierarchy) to better understand how the power of a 
subordinate affects managers’ behaviors. Also, because the relational distance of a 
subordinate (close versus distant) did not significantly alter self-interested behaviors, all 
future studies refer to the salient other as simply ‘subordinates’ as opposed to ‘direct 
subordinates. 
 
Study 2A: Subordinate’s Power and Granting Behavior  
With One Recipient 
The second study tested Hypothesis 2 that predicts that there is a negative relationship 




Table 4: Means and Standard Deviations by Condition 
 
 
Table 5: 2x2 ANOVA – Allocation (Self) 
 
 




M SD M SD
Close Authority $54,500 $9,780 .27 .45
Distant Authority $56,585 $10,099 .26 .44
Close No Authority $58,828 $15,059 .27 .45
Distant No Authority $60,629 $16,308 .39 .49
Control (No one) $61,887 $15,850 .46 .50
Note.  N  (Allocation (Self) = 392. N  (Lie) = 389. 
Allocation (Self) Lie
df F p η2
Authority 1 8.77 .003 .022
Relational Distance 1 2.282 .132 .006
Authority X Relational Distance 1 .026 .872 .000
Note.  N  = 392.
df F p η2
Authority 1 2.789 .098 .007
Relational Distance 1 2.01 .157 .005
Authority X Relational Distance 1 2.658 .104 .007




study, I again used an adapted version of the ultimatum bargaining game and manipulated 
and examined how the power of a subordinate affected the allocating and lying behaviors 
of a manager. 
 
Participants 
Based on results from an a priori power analysis with a desired power level of .80, an 
alpha probability of .05, and an effect size estimate of .20, 400 mTurk participants were 
needed to reach the desired level of power for this study. Because of the similarities 
between Studies 1 and 2a, I used the comprehension check failure rate from Study 1 
combined with the desired power for Study 2a to estimate that I should need 663 total 
participants. Of the initial sample of 663 participants, 311 failed at least one of two 
comprehension checks and their responses were removed from all further analyses. Of the 
remaining 352 participants, 45% were female and the average age was 36.05 (SD = 11.28). 
Participants were all U.S. citizens over the age of 18 and had an average of 13.01 years of 
full-time work experience (SD = 10.23). Ethnicities were self-reported as 76% White, 10% 
Asian, 6% Black, 5% Hispanic, and 2% other. Seventeen percent had a postgraduate 
degree, 36% had a bachelor’s degree, 32% had some college experience, and 15% had a 
high school degree. 
 
Design and Procedure 
The participants in this study were randomly placed into one of four conditions by 
manipulating two dimensions (2 x 2 design): subordinate’s power (high subordinate’s 




Managers’ allocation decisions and willingness to lie were the dependent variables. 
Subordinate’s request was manipulated in this design to both explore the effects of requests 
from subordinates on managers’ behavior and to ensure in the following studies that 
subordinate’s requests were not significantly correlated with a participant’s self-interested 
behavior (see Appendix D for full wording of the study instructions).  
After obtaining informed consent, participants engaged in the same UBG scenario from 
Study 1. Subordinate’s power and subordinate’s request were manipulated by embedding 
information in the scenario for the UBG. Participants read that they were in a group with 
one of their subordinates who was to help with the logistics of the allocation decision, but 
that, as managers, they were solely responsible for the allocation decision. In the high-
power subordinate condition, participants read that they were working with one of their 
higher paid and more influential subordinates. In the low-power subordinate condition, 
participants read that they were working with one of their lower paid and less influential 
subordinates. In the subordinate request condition, participants read that their subordinate 
would appreciate it if the recipient would receive more of the pool of available money. In 
the no subordinate request condition, participants were given no additional information 
regarding the subordinate. 




Self-interested behavior. Self-interested behavior was measured in the same two ways 




potential misrepresentation of the pool of funds. 
Comprehension checks. Participants were asked, “Please describe the subordinate that 
is helping you with the logistics of the allocation?” with possible responses being 1 (more 
influential and higher paid), 2 (less influential and lesser paid), or 3 (no information was 
given). Participants were also asked, “What request did your subordinate make?” with 
possible responses being 1 (no request was made), 2 (to give the other manager more 
money), or 3 (to keep all the money for yourself). I made an a priori decision to omit all 
subjects that failed either of the two comprehension checks.  
 
Results  
Manipulation check. To check the efficacy of the power manipulation, participants 
were asked to rate the power of the salient subordinate with potential responses ranging 
from 1 (no power) to 7 (a lot of power). Using a one-way ANOVA, I dummy coded the 
independent variable subordinate’s power as either 1 — high power or 0 — low power. 
The response to the question regarding the subordinate’s power was the dependent variable. 
Participants in the high power condition properly identified the salient subordinate as 
higher in power (M = 4.88, SD = 0.82), and participants in the low-power condition 
properly identified the salient subordinate as lower in power (M = 3.23, SD = 1.11). The 
two conditions were also significantly different from each other F(1, 351) = 230.911, p < 
.001, η2 = .397. These results indicate that the manipulation of subordinate’s power was 
effective. 
Study results. Dummy codes were used to create two dimensions of each independent 




and subordinate’s request (1 = request, 0 = no request). To test Hypothesis 2 — that there 
is a negative relationship between the power of a subordinate and the self-interested 
behavior of a manager — I used a 2 x 2 ANOVA where subordinate’s power and 
subordinate’s request were the independent variables and allocation to self and willingness 
to lie were the dependent variables, respectively. Contrary to expectations, the power of a 
subordinate was not a significant predictor of participants’ allocations to recipients, F(1, 
352) = 2.50, p = .115, η2 = .007 nor lying, F(1, 347) = .108, p = .742, η2 < .001. See Table 
7 for all means, standard deviations, and correlations. These initial results do not support 
Hypothesis 2 and potentially suggest that there may be no relationship between a 
subordinate’s power and the self-interested behavior of a manager. 
Upon further exploratory analysis, it appears that the subordinate’s request condition 
may have washed out all effects from subordinate’s power. Participants receiving requests 
from subordinates allocated less to themselves (M = $52,033, SD = $13,379) than 
participants the received no request (M = $56,511, SD = $13,394), F(1, 352) = 9.154, p = 
.003, η2 = .026, although a request from a subordinate was not a significant predictor of 
lying to recipients F(1, 347) = .176, p = .675, η2 = .001. Initially, a one-way ANOVA was 
run where the interaction of subordinate’s power and subordinate’s request was the 
independent variable, and allocation to self and willingness to lie were the dependent 
variables, respectively. This interaction had a marginal effect on allocations to self F(1, 
352) = 2.618, p = .107, η2 = .007, but did not significantly affect a participant’s willingness 
to lie F(1, 347) = .151, p = .151, η2 = .000.  
For further analysis, a one-way ANOVA was run where the dummy code for  




Table 7: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
 
to lie were the dependent variables, respectively. All participants in the request condition 
were omitted for this analysis. As predicted, participants with a high-power subordinate 
salient allocated less to themselves (M = $54,143, SD = $10,827) than participants with a 
low-power subordinate salient (M = $58,877, SD = $15,961), F(1, 182) = 5.074, p = .025, 
η2 = .027. Again, a subordinate’s power was not a significant predictor of lying to 
recipients F(1, 181) = .289, p = .269, η2 = .001. See Table 8 for means and standard 
deviations by condition, These results do provide support for Hypothesis 2 and suggest that 
there may actually be a relationship between a subordinate’s power and the self-interested 
behavior of a manager if a subordinate’s request were not washing out the effect of a 
subordinate’s power. See Table 9 and 10 for 2 x 2 ANOVA tables. 
 
Discussion  
Results from Study 2a give mixed support of Hypothesis 2 by demonstrating the 
salience of a high-power subordinate has a stronger influence over managers’ self-
interested behavior as compared to the salience of low-power subordinate, but only in the 
absence of a request from that subordinate. In the design of Study 2a, I believe that a 
subordinate’s request regarding an allocation is in direct opposition to potential self-  
M SD (1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Subordinate's Power .52 .50 ––
(2) Request .41 .49 .03 ––
(3) Allocation (Self) $54,553 $13,892 -.08 .18** ––
(4) Lie to Recipient .33 .47 -.02 .03 .53** ––
Note.  N = 352. Subordinate's power is coded 1 = high subordinate's power, 0 = low subordinate's power. Request is coded 
1 = request, 0 = no request.




Table 8: Means and Standard Deviations by Condition 
 
 
Table 9: 2x2 ANOVA – Allocation (Self) 
 
 
Table 10: 2x2 ANOVA – Willingness to Lie 
 
 
interested desires on the part of participants. In other words, satisfying the subordinate’s 
request (less allocation to self) would mean subverting a participant’s potential self-
interested desires (higher allocation to self). The normative power of a direct request is 
likely overriding the less normatively acceptable influence of self-interest. In order to allow 
for both self-interested and granting behaviors to exist simultaneously, I chose to create an 
additional study (Study 2B) where participants remain the allocator, but there exist two 
M SD M SD
High Power with Request $52,060 $14,589 .32 .47
Low Power with Request $52,005 $12,169 .32 .47
High Power No Request $54,143 $10,827 .33 .47
Low Power No Request $58,877 $15,961 .36 .48
Note.  N  = Allocation (Self) = 352. N  (Lie) = 347. 
Allocation (Self) Lie
df F p η2
Subordinate's Power 1 2.50 .115 .007
Subordinate's Request 1 9.154 .003 .026
Subordinate's Power X Subordinate's Request 1 2.618 .107 .007
Note.  N  = 352.
df F p η2
Subordinate's Power 1 .108 .742 .000
Subordinate's Request 1 .176 .675 .001
Subordinate's Power X Subordinate's Request 1 .151 .698 .000




recipients instead of one. The subordinate’s request is only regarding the allocation made 
regarding the allocation to the first recipient. Therefore, participants can still allocate more 
to the first recipient and satisfy their self-interest by allocating less money to the second 
recipient.  
 
Study 2B: Subordinate’s Power and Granting Behavior  
With Two Recipients 
Due to the findings of what was intended as Study 2 (listed above as Study 2A), I chose 
to run another study that was not initially planned (Study 2B). Based on the above findings, 
I felt that the normative power of granting a direct request overrode the potential self-
interested behavior. I chose to run Study 2 again, but this time I used two recipients. My 
intent was to create a design where an allocator could grant a request to allocate more funds 
to one of two recipients, but still engage in self-interested behavior if they felt so inclined 
(see Procedure section below for the design changes). In this study, I test both Hypothesis 
2 that predicts there is a negative relationship between the power of a subordinate and the 
self-interested behavior of a manager, and Hypothesis 3 that predicts there is a negative 
relationship between the power of a subordinate and the granting behavior of a manager. 
 
Participants 
Based on results from an a priori power analysis with a desired power level of .80, an 
alpha probability of .05, and an effect size estimate of .20, 400 mTurk participants were 
needed to reach the desired level of power for this study. Because of the similarities 




estimate that I should need 800 total participants. Of the initial sample of 800 participants, 
327 failed at least one of two comprehension checks and their responses were removed 
from all further analyses. Of the remaining 473 participants, 46% were female and the 
average age was 34.7 (SD = 10.53). Participants were all U.S. citizens over the age of 18 
and had an average of 12.23 years of full-time work experience (SD = 9.99). Ethnicities 
were self-reported as 79% White, 9% Asian, 7% Hispanic/Latino, 6% Black, and 3% other. 
Sixteen percent had a postgraduate degree, 36% had a bachelor’s degree, 32% had some 
college experience, and 15% had a high school degree. 
 
Design and Procedure 
The design in Study 2b was identical to that of Study 2A with two exceptions. First, 
participants were informed that they were the allocators of a sum of money ($100,000) and 
were tasked with dividing the money between themselves and two hypothetical recipients 
(as opposed to one recipient in the previous studies). Participants were informed that in this 
scenario each of the recipients would then decide whether to accept or reject the proposed 
allocation of money. If both recipients accepted, the money would be divided as proposed, 
but if either of the recipients rejected the offer, both parties would receive nothing (see 
Appendix E for full wording of the study instructions). Another pilot study using 25 mTurk 
subjects (Pilot 3) was run to determine at what point each recipient would potentially reject 
the allocation in a two recipient scenario (see Appendix F for full wording of the study 
instructions). The mean rejection amount was $23,550, which represented the minimum 
amount of allocation each recipient was willing to accept. 




allocator to give more money to the first of the two recipients. By having two recipients 
who could receive different amounts allocated to them, I was able to explore the difference 
in the funds allocated to the first recipient versus the second recipient. I used this difference 
score as a measure of the manager’s granting behavior. I chose to use a difference score 
instead of a ratio due to the potential complications of using a ratio when an allocation of 
zero is possible.  
This design enabled participants to satisfy a request made by a subordinate and also 
allowed for participants to satisfy their self-interest by allocating less money to the second 
recipient, if desired. An added benefit of this variation is that the design captures both self-
interested and granting behaviors without having to use separate conditions — effectively 
halving the required number of participants in future studies. This design should be 
particularly efficient for any future studies carried out in a lab setting.  
 
Measures  
Self-interested behavior. Self-interested behavior was measured in the same two ways 
as in the two previous studies: directly through the self-allocation of resources and 
indirectly through the misrepresentation of the pool of funds 
Granting. Granting behavior was measured in three ways. First, granting behavior was 
measured by the difference score of the allocations to the first and second recipients. 
Second, granting behavior was measured as a ratio of the allocation to the first recipient to 
the second recipient. Third, granting was measured as the amount of deviation from an 
equal split of the remaining funds after the allocation to self. An a priori analysis of these 




strongly correlated, the means were significantly different. Because the means 
demonstrated a significant difference, I ran all three measures of granting behavior to 
ensure the reliability of only reporting difference scores as a measure of granting behavior 
for further studies. In all cases (through this study and the studies to follow), the three 
measures of granting behavior demonstrated roughly identical levels of significance. For 
parsimony, I chose to only report the difference scores because all three measure 
demonstrate roughly equal results. This measure should be a direct measure of a 
participant’s willingness to grant a request from a subordinate. 
Comprehension checks. Participants were asked, “Please describe the subordinate that 
is helping you with the logistics of the allocation?” with possible responses being 1 (more 
influential and higher paid), 2 (less influential and lesser paid), or 3 (no information was 
given). Participants were also asked, “What request did your subordinate make?” with 
possible responses being 1 (no request was made), 2 (to give the other manager more 
money), or 3 (to keep all the money for yourself. I made an a priori decision to omit all 
subjects that failed either of the two comprehension checks.  
 
Results 
Manipulation check. To check the efficacy of the power manipulation, participants 
were again asked to rate the power of the salient subordinate with potential responses 
ranging from 1 (no power) to 7 (a lot of power). Using a one-way ANOVA, I dummy coded 
the independent variable subordinate’s power as either 1 — high-power subordinate or 0 
— low-power subordinate. The response to the question regarding the subordinate’s power 




identified the salient subordinate as higher in power (M = 4.87, SD = 0.87), and participants 
in the low-power subordinate condition properly identified the salient subordinate as lower 
in power (M = 3.34, SD = 1.06). The two conditions were also significantly different from 
each other F(1, 472) = 297.30, p < .001, η2 = .387. These results indicate that the 
manipulation of subordinate’s power was effective. 
Study results. Dummy codes were again used to create two dimensions of each 
independent variable: subordinate’s power (1 = high subordinate’s power, 0 = low 
subordinate’s power) and subordinate’s request (1 = request, 0 = no request). To test 
Hypothesis 2 — that there is a negative relationship between the power of a subordinate 
and the self-interested behavior of a manager — I used a 2 x 2 ANOVA where 
subordinate’s power and subordinate’s request were the independent variables and 
allocation to self and willingness to lie were the dependent variables, respectively. There 
was no main effect for power of the subordinate on participant’s allocations to recipients, 
F(1, 472) = .815, p = .367, η2 = .002 nor lying, F(1, 472) = .005, p = .942, η2 < .001. 
Although some results from Study 2a suggested the opposite, these results do not support 
Hypothesis 2 and potentially suggest that there may be no relationship between a 
subordinate’s power and the self-interested behavior of a manager. 
To test Hypothesis 3 — that predicts there is a negative relationship between the power 
of a subordinate and the granting behavior of a manager — I used the same 2 x 2 ANOVA 
where subordinate’s power and subordinate’s request were the independent variables and 
difference in allocations to the two recipients was the dependent variable. The results 
indicate that participants were significantly more likely to grant a high-power subordinate’s 




SD = $7,164), F(1, 472) = 5.762, p = .017, η2 = .012. See Table 11 for means, standard 
deviations, and correlations. See Table 12 for means and standard deviations by condition. 
These results show support for Hypothesis 3 and suggest that there is a relationship 
between a subordinate’s power and the granting behavior of a manager. See Table 13, 14, 
and 15 for 2 x 2 ANOVA tables. 
 
Discussion 
Although some evidence in Study 2A provided support for Hypothesis 2, results from 
Study 2b do not support Hypothesis 2 by failing to demonstrate that the salience of a high-
power subordinate has a stronger influence over managers’ self-interested behavior as 
compared to the salience of low-power subordinate. Results from this study do support 
Hypothesis 3 by demonstrating that a request made by a salient high-power subordinate 
has a stronger influence over a manager’s granting behavior as compared to a request made 
by a salient low-power subordinate.  
 
Study 3: Necessity of a Leader 
In this study, I combined the constructs of substitutes for leadership and leaders’ self-
efficacy to measure the necessity of a leader. Whereas this study did not directly test any 
hypotheses, Study 3 empirically tested how well these two constructs assess a leader’s 
necessity. Leaders’ necessity is not a new construct but a combination of two existing 
constructs that represent the two dimensions that I believe are vital in determining the need 
for a leader. I argue that only managers who do not have (do have) salient substitutes for 




Table 11: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
 
Table 12: Means and Standard Deviations by Condition 
 
 
Table 13: 2x2 ANOVA – Allocation (Self) 
 
 
Table 14: 2x2 ANOVA – Granting 
 
M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Subordinate's Power .51 .50 ––
(2) Request .54 .50 .02 ––
(3) Allocation (Self) $46,620 $18,127 -.04 -0.02 ––
(4) Lie to Recipient 1 .78 .41 .00 -0.002 -.48** ––
(5) Lie to Recipient 2 .76 .43 -.04 -0.07 -.47** .88** ––
(6) Allocation Difference (R1 - R2) $1,826 $5,992 .12* .22** 0.04 0.02 -.07 ––
Note.  N = 473. Subordinate's power is coded 1 = high subordinate's power, 0 = low subordinate's power. 
Request is coded 1 = request, 0 = no request.
* p  < .05. ** p  < .01.
M SD M SD M SD M SD
High Power with Request $45,604 $17,493 $3,907 $6,990 .77 .43 .67 .47
Low Power with Request $46,871 $18,600 $2,099 $7,164 .80 .40 .79 .41
High Power No Request $46,209 $18,088 $807 $5,471 .81 .40 .82 .39
Low Power No Request $47,967 $18,535 $37 $716 .76 .43 .76 .43
Note.  N  = 472.
Allocation (Self) Allocation (R1 - R2) Lie (Recipient 1) Lie (Recipient 2)
df F p η2
Subordinate's Power 1 .815 .367 .002
Subordinate's Request 1 .258 .612 .001
Subordinate's Power X Subordinate's Request 1 .021 .884 .000
Note.  N  = 472.
df F p η2
Subordinate's Power 1 5.762 .017 .012
Subordinate's Request 1 23.093 .000 .047
Subordinate's Power X Subordinate's Request 1 .932 .335 .002




Table 15: 2x2 ANOVA – Willingness to Lie 
 
 
necessary. Additionally, I planned to collapse the off diagonal conditions in the latter 
studies contingent on the findings of this study.  
 
Participants  
Based on results from an a priori power analysis with a desired power level of .80, an 
alpha probability of .05, and an effect size estimate of .20, 400 mTurk participants were 
needed to reach the desired level of power for this study. I estimated that I would need 500 
total participants to reach the desired level of power. Of the initial sample of 500 
participants, 206 failed at least one of two comprehension checks and their responses were 
removed from all further analyses. Additionally, five participants failed to fill out any data. 
Of the remaining 289 participants, 48% were female and the average age was 36.46 (SD = 
11.85). Participants were all U.S. Citizens over the age of 18 and had an average of 13.87 
years of full-time work experience (SD = 11.20). Ethnicities were self-reported as 79% 
White, 7% Black, 6% Asian, 5% Hispanic/Latino, and 3% other. Fifteen percent had a 
postgraduate degree, 38% had a bachelor’s degree, 32% had some college experience, and 
15% had at least obtained a high school degree. 
 
 
df F p η2
Subordinate's Power 1 .005 .942 .000
Subordinate's Request 1 .001 .973 .000
Subordinate's Power X Subordinate's Request 1 1.156 .283 .002




Design and Procedure 
The extent to which substitutes for leadership and leader’s self-efficacy effectively 
measure leader’s self-perceived necessity was explored by manipulating two dimensions 
(2 x 2 design): substitutes for leadership and leader’s self-efficacy. Self-assessment of the 
participant’s necessity was the dependent variable. After obtaining informed consent, 
participants were asked to read and answer questions regarding a brief scenario. 
Participants were informed that they were managers at a company and asked to determine 
how actively they should manage their team for a given task. They were given information 
regarding the company, the task, and their subordinates and then asked questions regarding 
how necessary they were to the successful completion of the task (see Appendix G for full 
wording of the study instructions). 
Participants were randomly placed into one of four conditions, and substitutes for 
leadership and leader’s self-efficacy were manipulated by embedding information in the 
scenario. In the perceived substitutes not present condition, participants were told that the 
task had complex considerations and thus required strong leadership. In the perceived 
substitutes present condition, participants were told that the task was simple and 
straightforward and thus did not require strong leadership. In the high leader’s self-efficacy 
condition, participants were told that they were the managers of this task because of their 
strong ability to effectively manage their team. In the low leader’s self-efficacy condition, 
participants were told that they were the manager of this task despite lacking any particular 
abilities to effectively manage their team. Participants reported on their self-perceptions of 
the necessity of the leader (themselves) in the scenario. Both leader’s self-efficacy and 





Leader’s necessity. Leader’s necessity was measured using a one-item self-report 
question that asked participants to rate their self-perceived necessity in regards to the bonus 
allocation scenario with potential responses ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). 
Comprehension checks. Participants were asked, “Please describe the allocation?” 
with possible responses being 1 (complex), 2 (simple and straightforward), or 3 (no 
information was given). Participants were also asked, “Regarding the scenario, please 
describe your leadership abilities relative to the task to allocate $100,000?” with possible 
responses being 1 (you were chosen because of your strong ability to lead), 2 (you were 
chosen despite lacking any particular ability to lead), or 3 (no information was given). I 




Manipulation checks. To check the effectiveness of the efficacy manipulation, 
participants were asked to rate their self-efficacy using Robertson and Sadri’s (1993) 
managerial self-efficacy scale (see Appendix H for complete measure). Participants were 
given a list of 11 statements regarding their ability to manage and asked to rate themselves 
with potential responses ranging from 1 (almost always untrue) to 5 (almost always true). 
Using a one-way ANOVA, I dummy coded the independent variable leader’s self-efficacy 
as either 1 — high leader’s self-efficacy or 0 — low leader’s self-efficacy. Responses to 




Participants in the high self-efficacy condition properly rated themselves as higher in 
leader’s self-efficacy (M = 4.09, SD = 0.57), and participants in the low self-efficacy 
condition properly rated themselves as lower in leader’s self-efficacy (M = 3.60, SD = 
0.76). The two conditions were also significantly different from each other F(1, 288) = 
39.63, p < .001, η2 = .121. These results indicate that the manipulation of leader’s self-
efficacy was effective. 
To check the effectiveness of the substitutes for leadership manipulation, participants 
were asked to rate the substitutes for leadership present using Podsakoff and MacKenzie’s 
(1993) condensed substitutes for leadership scale (condensed from the original substitutes 
for leadership scale; Kerr & Jermier, 1978). Participants were given a list of 13 statements 
regarding 13 different types of a substitutes for leadership (see Appendix I for complete 
measure) and with potential responses ranging from 1 (almost always untrue) to 5 (almost 
always true). Using a one-way ANOVA, I dummy coded the independent variable 
substitutes for leadership as either 1 — substitutes not present or 0 — substitutes present. 
Responses to the condensed substitutes for leadership scale were aggregated and used as 
the dependent variable. Participants in the substitutes not present condition did not properly 
rate substitutes for leadership as less present (M = 3.29, SD = 0.36), and participants in the 
substitutes present condition did not properly rate substitutes for leadership as more present 
(M = 3.28, SD = 0.31). The two conditions were also not significantly different from each 
other F(1, 289) = .038, p < .846, η2 = .000. These results indicate that the manipulation of 
was not effective even though the overall results of the study suggested that it was effective. 
To address this issue, I ran a brief study using 200 mTurk participants in two 




participants read, “Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. Your boss 
has asked you to allocate a $100,000 bonus. Your subordinates at work will help you with 
the decision, but you will ultimately get the final say over the allocation decision.” (This 
task has complex considerations and thus requires strong leadership/This task is simple and 
straightforward and thus does not require strong leadership.) Participants were then asked 
to rate the substitutes for leadership that were present using the original substitutes for 
leadership scale (Kerr & Jermier, 1978). I went back to the original substitutes for 
leadership scale because I only manipulated one form of substitutes for leadership (nature 
of the task). I used all seven ‘nature of the task’ items from the original scale (see Appendix 
J for full measure), which were aggregated and used as the dependent variable.  
Using a one-way ANOVA, I dummy coded the independent variable substitutes for 
leadership as either 1 — substitutes not present or 0 — substitutes present. Participants in 
the substitutes not present condition properly rated substitutes for leadership as less present 
(M =2.46, SD = 0.67), and participants in the substitutes present condition properly rated 
substitutes for leadership as more present (M = 3.61, SD = 0.66). The two conditions were 
also significantly different from each other F(1, 111) = 83.73, p < .001, η2 = .432. Although 
these were different participants from the original study, these results suggest that the 
manipulation of substitutes for leadership was effective even though the initial 
manipulation check was unreliable. 
Study results. Dummy codes were again used to create two dimensions of each 
independent variable: substitutes for leadership (1 = substitutes not present, 0 = substitutes 
present) and leader’s self-efficacy (1 = high leader’s self-efficacy, 0 = low leader’s self-




x 2 ANOVA where perceived substitutes for leadership and leader’s self-efficacy were the 
independent variables and self-perceived necessity was the dependent variable. As 
anticipated, participants who lacked substitutes to their leadership perceived themselves as 
more necessary (M =5.75, SD = 1.12) than participants that perceived more substitutes to 
be present (M =5.19, SD = 1.33), F(1, 289) = 17.913, p < .001, η2 = .05. Additionally, 
participants with higher leader’s self-efficacy perceived themselves as more necessary (M 
= 5.90, SD = 1.34) than participants with low leader’s self-efficacy (M = 5.03, SD = 1.46), 
F(1, 289) = 35.355, p < .001, η2 = .11. See Table 16 for means, standard deviations, and 
correlation. 
Participants who both lacked substitutes to their leadership and had high leader’s self-
efficacy (M = 6.11, SD = .90) perceived themselves as more necessary than participants 
who either lacked substitutes to their leadership or had high leader’s self-efficacy (M = 
5.53, SD = 1.21), F(1, 218) = 4.06, p = .045, η2 = .04. Furthermore, participants who had 
both substitutes to their leadership and had low leader’s self-efficacy (M = 4.68, SD = 1.58) 
perceived themselves as less necessary than participants that either lacked substitutes to 
their leadership or had high leader’s self-efficacy (M = 5.53, SD = 1.21), F(1, 207) = 9.632, 
p = .002, η2 = .10. Participants who lacked substitutes to their leadership but had low 
leader’s self-efficacy (M = 5.38, SD = 1.34) did not perceive themselves as significantly 
more necessary than participants who had substitutes to their leadership present but had 
high leader’s self-efficacy (M = 5.69, SD = 1.09), F(1, 138) = 2.147, p = .145, η2 = .01. 
See Table 17 for all means and standard deviations by condition. See Table 18 for the 2 x 





Table 16: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
 
Table 17: Means and Standard Deviations by Condition 
 
 








M SD (1) (2) (3)
(1) Substitutes for Leadership 1.48 .50 ––
(2) Leader's Efficacy 1.45 .50 -.04 ––
(3) Self-Perceived Necessity 5.18 1.00 .26** -.36** ––
Note.  N = 289. Substitutes for Leadership  is coded 1 = substititutes not present, 0 = substitutes present. 
Leader's Efficacy is coded 1 = high efficacy, 0 = low efficacy.
** p  < .01.
M SD
Efficacy with No Substitutes 6.11 .90
No Efficacy with No Substitutes 5.38 1.34
Efficacy with Substitutes 5.69 1.09
No Efficacy with Substitutes 4.68 1.58
Note.  N  = 289. Necessity reflects self-perceptions of the participant's necessity.
Necessity
df F p η2
Substitutes for Leadership 1 17.913 .000 .05
Efficacy 1 35.355 .000 .11
Substitutes for Leadership  x Efficacy 1 .902 .343 .003





Results from Study 3 give evidence that both substitutes for leadership and leader’s 
self-efficacy are significant predictors of a leader’s self-perceived necessity. As 
anticipated, both the lack of substitutes for leadership and high leader’s self-efficacy 
together are the strongest predictors of high self-perceived necessity, and both the presence 
of substitutes and low leader’s self-efficacy together are the strongest predictors of low 
self-perceived necessity. Having only one dimension of either substitutes for leadership or 
leader’s self-efficacy present does significantly alter perceptions of self-perceived 
necessity, but not as strongly as when both dimensions are present. Therefore, all of the 
following studies will only use the dimensions of substitutes for leadership/high leader’s 
self-efficacy (high necessity) or the presence of substitutes and low leader’s self-efficacy 
(low necessity) to manipulate a leader’s self-perceived necessity. 
 
Study 4: Subordinates’ Salience, Leader’s Necessity, and Managers’  
Self-Interested and Granting Behaviors 
The fourth study tested Hypotheses 4 and 5. Hypothesis 4 predicts that there is a 
positive relationship between a manager’s self-perceived necessity and the self-interested 
behavior of a manager, and Hypothesis 5 predicts that there is a negative relationship 
between a manager’s self-perceived necessity and the granting behavior of a manager. I 
used a similar adapted version of the UBG from Study 2B and manipulated the self-
perceived necessity of the leader to examine how leaders’ necessity affects the allocation 






Based on results from an a priori power analysis with a desired power level of .80, an 
alpha probability of .05, an effect size estimate of .20 and previous comprehension check 
failure rates, 200 mTurk participants were needed to reach the desired level of power for 
this study. Using the same estimate of total participants used in study 2B, I estimated I 
would need 400 total participants. Of the initial sample of 400 participants, 188 failed at 
least one of two comprehension checks and their responses were removed from all further 
analyses. Of the remaining 212 participants, 43% were female and the average age was 
37.74 (SD = 11.84). Participants were all U.S. Citizens over the age of 18 and had an 
average of 14.97 years of full-time work experience (SD = 11.84). Ethnicities were self-
reported as 75% White, 9% Black, 7% Asian, 5% Hispanic/Latino, and 2% other. Ten 
percent had a postgraduate degree, 40% had a bachelor’s degree, 37% had some college 
experience, and 13% had at least a high school degree. 
 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were given similar UBG instructions given in Study 2B. In this study, self-
perceptions of a leader’s necessity were manipulated along a single dimension: leader’s 
self-perceived necessity, and managers’ allocations to self, willing to lie, and the difference 
in the allocation to the recipients were the dependent variables. The same descriptions of 
leader’s necessity used in Study 3 were used in the manipulations for this study (see 
Appendix K for full wording of the study instructions). In the high leader’s self-perceived 
necessity condition, participants were told that the allocation of bonus money required 




low leader’s self-perceived necessity condition, participants were told that the allocation 
of bonus money did not require particularly strong leadership and that they were chosen 
despite lacking any particular qualifications to lead.  
Participants were again informed of both pilot studies and told that their allocation of 
resources would be accepted or rejected based on the findings from the two pilot studies. 
After obtaining informed consent, participants were asked to engage in the UBG. 
Participants were informed that they were the allocators of a sum of money ($100,000) and 
were tasked with dividing the money between themselves and two other recipients. 
Participants were told that a subordinate would help with the logistics of the allocation 
decision, but no other information was given regarding their subordinate. Participants were 
informed that in this scenario the recipients would then decide whether to accept or reject 
the proposed allocation of money. If both recipients accepted, the money was divided as 
proposed, but if either recipient rejected the offer, all parties received nothing. Participants 
would again be informed that they could receive a bonus that was dependent on their 
allocation decision. In all conditions, the salient subordinate asks for more money to be 
allocated to the first of the two recipients. After the allocators proposed the distribution of 
money and chose how to represent the total pool of money to recipients, participants then 
completed a manipulation check—including a measure of the power of the salient other 
party—and a brief demographics survey. Within a week of survey completion, participants 
were informed if the distribution of funds was accepted, and the allocation bonus was paid 







Self-interested behavior. Self-interested behavior was measured in the same two ways 
as in the previous studies: directly through the self-allocation of resources and indirectly 
through the potential misrepresentation of the pool of funds 
Granting. Granting behavior was measured by the difference score of the first and 
second recipients. This measure should be a direct measure of a participant’s willingness 
to grant a request from a subordinate. 
Comprehension checks. Participants were asked questions with answers taken 
verbatim from the scenario. Specifically, participants were asked, “Please describe the 
allocation?” with possible responses being 1 (complex), 2 (simple and straightforward), or 
3 (no information was given). Participants were also asked, “Regarding the scenario, please 
describe your leadership abilities relative to the task to allocate $100,000?” with possible 
responses being 1 (you were chosen because of your strong ability to lead), 2 (you were 
chosen despite lacking any particular ability to lead), or 3 (no information was given). I 




Manipulation check. To check the efficacy of the leader’s self-perceived necessity 
manipulation, participants were asked to self-rate their perceived necessity with potential 
responses ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Using a one-way 
ANOVA, I dummy coded the independent variable leader’s self-perceived necessity as 




necessity. The response to the question regarding the participants’ self-perceived necessity 
was the dependent variable. Participants in the high leader’s self-perceived necessity 
condition properly identified themselves more necessary (M = 6.01, SD = 0.90), and 
participants in the low leader’s self-perceived necessity condition properly identified 
themselves less necessary (M = 4.97, SD = 1.40). The two conditions were also 
significantly different from each other F(1, 212) = 7.268, p = .007, η2 = .034. These results 
indicate that the manipulation of leader’s self-perceived necessity was effective. 
Orthogonality check. To ensure that manipulations of an allocator’s self-perceived 
necessity did not affect perceptions of the salient subordinates power, participants were 
asked to rate the power of the salient subordinate with potential responses ranging from 1 
(no power) to 7 (a lot of power). Using a one-way ANOVA, I used the dummy codes for 
the independent variable leader’s self-perceived necessity: 1 — high leader’s self-
perceived necessity or 0 — low leader’s self-perceived necessity. The response to the 
question regarding the subordinate’s power was the dependent variable. Participants in the 
high leader’s self-perceived necessity condition properly identified the salient subordinate 
as no different in power (M = 2.81, SD = 1.42) to participants ratings of the salient 
subordinate’s power in the low leader’s self-perceived necessity condition (M = 2.91, SD 
= 1.56). The two conditions were also not significantly different from each other F(1, 208) 
= .247, p = .623, η2 = .001. These results indicate that a leader’s self-perceived necessity 
is not significantly related to perceptions of a subordinate’s power.  
Study results. To test the independent variable leader’s self-perceived necessity, I used 
the dummy used in the previous manipulation check (1 = high leader’s self-perceived 




a positive relationship between a manager’s self-perceived necessity and the self-interested 
behavior of a manager — I used one-way ANOVA’s where leader’s self-perceived 
necessity was the independent variable and allocation to self and the willingness to lie to 
each of the recipients were the dependent variables, respectively. Contrary to predictions, 
self-perceptions of a leader’s necessity was not a significant predictor of allocating more 
to self F(1, 212) = 1.03, p = .311, η2 = .005 or lying to the first F(1, 212) = .33, p = .565, 
η2 = .002 or second recipient F(1, 212) = .56, p = .453, η2 = .003. See Table 19 for all 
means, standard deviations, and correlations. These results do not support Hypothesis 4 
and suggest that there may be no direct relationship between a self-perceived leader’s 
necessity and the self-interested behaviors of a manager. 
To test Hypothesis 5 — that there is a negative relationship between a manager’s self-
perceived necessity and the granting behavior of a manager — I used one-way ANOVA 
where leader’s necessity was the independent variable and the difference score in the 
allocation between the first and second recipient was the dependent variable. Contrary to 
predictions, self-perceptions of a leader’s necessity was not a significant predictor of 
allocating more to the first recipient F(1, 212) = 1.23, p = .268, η2 = .006. See Table 19 for 
all means, standard deviations, and correlations. These results do not support Hypothesis 5 
and suggest that there may be no direct relationship between a self-perceived leader’s 
necessity and the granting behaviors of a manager. See Table 20 for all means and standard 







Table 19: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
 




Results from Study 4 do not support Hypothesis 4 nor Hypothesis 5 by failing to 
demonstrate that the self-perceived necessity of a leader influences a managers’ self- 
interested behavior or granting behaviors, respectively. Although a leader’s self- perceived 
necessity did not have a direct effect on self-interested nor granting behaviors, Hypotheses 
6 and 7 propose leader’s necessity as a moderating variable. In Study 5, I again test a 
leader’s self-perceived necessity to better understand how self-perceptions of a leader’s 
necessity may alter the relationship between subordinates’ power and self-interested and/or 




M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Leader's Necessity 1.56 .50 ––
(2) Allocation (Self) $45,682 $18,076 .07 ––
(3) Lie to Recipient 1 .51 .50 -.04 .54** ––
(4) Lie to Recipient 2 .54 .50 -.05 .49** .92** ––
(5) Allocation Difference (R1 - R2) $2,675 $5,365 -.07 -.02 .15* .19** ––
Note.  N = 209. Leader's Necessity is coded 1 = high leader's nedcessity, 0 = low leader's necessity. 
* p  < .05. ** p  < .01.
M SD M SD M SD M SD
High Necessity $44,147 $15,202 $3,121 $4,203 .53 .50 .56 .50
Low Necessity $46,714 $20,044 $2,280 $6,214 .49 .50 .51 .50
Note.  N  = 212.




Study 5: Subordinates’ Power, Leader’s Necessity, and Managers’  
Self-Interested and Granting Behaviors 
Studies 5 and 6 tested Hypotheses 6 and 7. Hypothesis 6 predicts that the negative 
relationship between the power of a subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a 
manager is moderated by a manager’s self-perceived necessity. Hypothesis 7 predicts that 
the positive relationship between the power of a subordinate and the granting behavior of 
their manager’s behavior is moderated by a manager’s self-perceived necessity. I planned 
to use the same adapted version of the UBG used in Study 4, but also manipulate the power 
of a subordinate in addition to leader’s necessity. Even though I did not find that a leader’s 
self-perceived necessity significantly affected the dependent variables of interest in Study 
4, I believed that a leader’s self-perceived necessity might still interact with subordinate’s 
power. Therefore, I continued with the study as planned. In this study, I used the 
manipulation of the self-perceived necessity of a leader from Study 4 and examined how a 
leader’s self-perceived necessity affects the relationship between a subordinate’s power 
and the allocation behaviors of a manager from Study 2b (see Appendix L for full wording 
of the study instructions). 
 
Participants 
Based on results from an a priori power analysis with a desired power level of .80, an 
alpha probability of .05, and an effect size estimate of .20, 400 mTurk participants were 
needed to reach the desired level of power for this study. To ensure full power for this more 
complex study, 1060 total mTurk participants were recruited. Of the initial sample of 1060 




removed from all further analyses. Of the remaining 409 participants, 49% were female 
and the average age was 35.5 (SD = 10.94). Participants were all U.S. citizens over the age 
of 18 and had an average of 13.5 years of full-time work experience (SD = 12.0). Ethnicities 
were self-reported as 77% White, 9% Asian, 7% Black, 5% Hispanic/Latino, and 3% other. 
Fourteen percent had a postgraduate degree, 36% had a bachelor’s degree, 38% had some 
college experience, and 11% had a high school degree. 
 
Design and Procedure 
After obtaining informed consent, participants were given the same general UBG 
instructions given in Study 4. Participants were again assigned to the manager role and 
randomly placed into one of four conditions. Participants were randomly placed into one 
of four conditions by manipulating two dimensions (2 x 2 design): subordinate’s power 
(using the same manipulation from Study 2b) and leader’s self-perceived necessity (using 
the same manipulation from Study 4). Again, managers’ allocation decisions and 
willingness to lie to recipients were the dependent variables. In the high subordinate’s 
power conditions, participants read that one of their higher paid and more influential 
subordinates suggested that they would appreciate it if the first of the two recipients 
received more of the pool of available money. In the low subordinate’s power conditions, 
participants read that one of their lower paid and less influential subordinates suggested 
that would appreciate it if the first of the two recipients received more of the pool of 
available money. In the high leader’s self-perceived necessity conditions, participants read 
that the allocation of bonus money required strong leadership and that they were chosen 




conditions, participants read that the allocation of bonus money did not require particularly 
strong leadership and that they were chosen despite lacking any particular qualifications to 
lead. The remainder of Study 5 proceeded as described in Study 4. 
  
Measures 
Self-interested behavior. Self-interested behavior was measured in the same two ways 
as in the previous studies: directly through the self-allocation of resources and indirectly 
through the potential misrepresentation of the pool of funds 
Granting. Granting behavior was measured by the difference score in the allocations 
given to the first and second recipients. This measure should be a direct measure of a 
participant’s willingness to grant a request from a subordinate. 
Comprehension checks. Due to the complexity of the study design, there were three 
comprehension check questions in this study, which resulted in higher failure rates than 
previous studies. All answers to the comprehension questions were taken verbatim from 
the scenario. First, participants were asked, “Please describe the allocation?” with possible 
responses being 1 (complex), 2 (simple and straightforward), or 3 (no information was 
given). Participants were also asked, “Regarding the scenario, please describe your 
leadership abilities relative to the task to allocate $100,000?” with possible responses being 
1 (you were chosen because of your strong ability to lead), 2 (you were chosen despite 
lacking any particular ability to lead), or 3 (no information was given). Finally, participants 
were asked to, “Please describe your subordinate that is helping you with the logistics of 
the allocation” with possible responses being 1 (more influential and higher paid), 2 (less 




omit all subjects that failed any of the three comprehension checks. 
  
Results 
Manipulation check. To check the efficacy of the subordinate’s power manipulation, 
participants were again asked to rate the power of the salient subordinate with potential 
responses ranging from 1 (no power) to 7 (a lot of power). Using a one-way ANOVA, I 
dummy coded the independent variable subordinate’s power as either 1 — high-power 
subordinate or 0 — low-power subordinate. The response to the question regarding the 
subordinate’s power was the dependent variable. Participants in the high-power 
subordinate condition properly identified the salient subordinate as higher in power (M = 
4.99, SD = 0.87), and participants in the low-power subordinate condition properly 
identified the salient subordinate as lower in power (M = 3.26, SD = 1.16). The two 
conditions were also significantly different from each other F(1, 402) = 279.28, p < .001, 
η2 = .411. These results indicate that the manipulation of subordinate’s power was 
effective. 
To check the efficacy of the leader’s self-perceived necessity manipulation, participants 
were asked to self-rate their perceived necessity with potential responses ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Using a one-way ANOVA, I dummy coded the 
independent variable leader’s self-perceived necessity as either 1 — high leader’s self-
perceived necessity or 0 — low leader’s self-perceived necessity. The response to the 
question regarding the participants’ self-perceived necessity was the dependent variable. 
Participants in the high leader’s self-perceived necessity condition properly identified 




perceived necessity condition properly identified themselves less necessary (M = 4.85, SD 
= 1.01). The two conditions were also significantly different from each other F(1, 329) = 
29.55, p < .001, η2 = .083. These results indicate that the manipulation of leader’s self-
perceived necessity was effective. 
Study results. Dummy codes from the previous manipulation checks were used for 
each independent variable: subordinate’s power (1 = high subordinate’s power, 0 = low 
subordinate’s power) and leader’s self-perceived necessity (1 = high leader’s self-
perceived necessity, 0 = low leader’s self-perceived necessity). To test Hypothesis 6 — 
that the negative relationship between the power of a subordinate and the self-interested 
behavior of a manager is moderated by a manager’s self-perceived necessity — I used a 2 
x 2 ANOVA where subordinate’s power and leader’s self-perceived necessity were the 
independent variables and allocation to self and willingness to lie to each recipient were 
the dependent variables, respectively. Contrary to expectations, a leader’s self-perceived 
necessity did not moderate the relationship between a subordinate’s power and 
participant’s allocations to recipients, F(1, 409) = 1.65, p = .199, η2 = .004, nor lying to 
the first F(1, 404) = 2.69, p = .102, η2 < .007 or second recipient F(1, 404) = 1.92, p = 
.185, η2 < .005. See Table 21 for all means, standard deviations, and correlations. These 
results do not support Hypothesis 6 and suggest that there may be no relationship between 
a leader’s self-perceived necessity, subordinate’s power, and the self-interested behavior 
of a manager. 
To test Hypothesis 7 — that the positive relationship between the power of a 
subordinate and the granting behavior of their manager’s behavior is moderated by a 




Table 21: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
 
subordinate’s power, 0 = low subordinate’s power) and leader’s self-perceived necessity 
(1 = high leader’s self-perceived necessity, 0 = low leader’s self-perceived necessity) were 
again used. I used a 2 x 2 ANOVA where subordinate’s power and leader’s self-perceived 
necessity were the independent variables and the difference between the allocations to the 
first and second recipient was the dependent variable. Contrary to prediction, a leader’s 
self-perceived necessity did not moderate the relationship between a subordinate’s power 
and granting a subordinate’s request, F(1, 409) = 1.836, p = .176, η2 = .005. See Table 21 
for all means, standard deviations, and correlations. Although these results do not support 
Hypothesis 7, this study does provide further evidence in support of Hypothesis 3 in that 
participants were significantly more likely to grant a high-power subordinate’s request (M 
= $5,599, SD = $8,646) than a low-power subordinate’s request (M = $2,463, SD = $5,569), 
F(1, 190) = 19.153, p < .001, η2 = .045. As in Study 2B, there was no main effect for 
subordinate’s power on a leader’s self-interested behavior. See Table 22 for all means and 
standard deviations by condition. See Table 23, 24, and 25 for 2 x 2 ANOVA tables. 
 
 
M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Subordinate's Power 1.54 .50 ––
(2) Leader's Necessity 1.48 .50 -.04 ––
(3) Allocation (Self) $43,992 $17,698 .04 .02 ––
(4) Lie to Recipient 1 .51 .50 -.01 .06 .51** ––
(5) Lie to Recipient 2 .51 .50 -.01 .06 .51** 1.00** ––
(6) Allocation Difference (R1 - R2) $3,971 $7,414 -.22** -.01 -.17** -.001 -.001 ––
Note.  N = 473. Subordinate's power is coded 1 = high subordinate's power, 0 = low subordinate's power. 
Leader's Necessity is coded 1 = high leader's nedcessity, 0 = low leader's necessity.




Table 22: Means and Standard Deviations by Condition 
 
 
Table 23: 2x2 ANOVA – Allocation (Self) 
 
 
Table 24: 2x2 ANOVA – Granting 
 
 




M SD M SD M SD M SD
High Power Sub / High Necessity $44,143 $18,799 $5,181 $7,509 .53 .50 .53 .50
High Power Sub / Low Necessity $43,260 $18,604 $6,017 $9,783 .50 .50 .50 .50
Low Power Sub / High Necessity $43,246 $16,270 $3,016 $5,888 .45 .50 .45 .50
Low Power Sub / Low Necessity $47,000 $19,178 $1,910 $5,251 .58 .50 .58 .50
Note.  N  = 409.
Allocation (Self) Allocation (R1 - R2) Lie (Recipient 1) Lie (Recipient 2)
df F p η2
Subordinate's Power 1 .622 .431 .002
Leader's Necessity 1 .633 .427 .002
Subordinate's Power X Leader's Necessity 1 1.652 .199 .004
Note.  N  = 409.
df F p η2
Subordinate's Power 1 19.153 .000 .045
Leader's Necessity 1 .036 .851 .000
Subordinate's Power X Leader's Necessity 1 1.836 .176 .005
Note.  N  = 409.
df F p η2
Subordinate's Power 1 .005 .946 .000
Leader's Necessity 1 .973 .325 .002
Subordinate's Power X Leader's Necessity 1 2.689 .102 .007





Results from Study 5 do not support Hypothesis 6 or Hypothesis 7 by failing to 
demonstrate that a leader’s self-perceived necessity moderates the relationship between 
subordinates’ power and self-interested or granting behavior, respectively. Although I was 
unable to show a moderating effect of leader’s self-perceived necessity, I did find 
additional support for Hypothesis 3 that there is a negative relationship between a 
subordinate’s power and a leader’s willingness to grant a request. In Study 6, I do one final 
test on the relationship between a leader’s self-perceived necessity, a subordinate’s power, 
and self-interested behaviors. In the final study, I amended the design from two recipients 
back to one. The studies with one recipient showed some evidence for a positive 
relationship between subordinates’ power and self-interested behaviors, but that effect was 
not found when there were two recipients. I reverted to one recipient in the design of Study 
6 to explore the potential moderating effect of a leader’s necessity in a slightly different 
context from the previous two studies. 
 
Study 6: Subordinates’ Power, Leader’s Necessity, and Managers’  
Self-Interested Behaviors 
In Study 6, I used survey methodology to pose hypothetical questions based on real 
experiences with an employee and an actual organizational task to explore Hypothesis 6. 
 
Participants 
Participants for this study were students obtaining a Professional MBA at the 




experience. I used that experience in hopes of enhancing the external validity of my studies. 
The power for this study was contingent on the enrollment of the classes and the 
willingness of the students to participate. Out of 105 possible PMBA students, 17 did not 
participate. On the day the survey was administered, six students were absent, nine students 
arrived too late to participate, and seven students chose not to participate in the study. Of 
the remaining 83 participants, 29% were female and the average age was 30.17 (SD = 4.59). 
Participants had an average of 7.15 years of full-time work experience (SD = 4.33). 
Ethnicities were self-reported as 89% White, 4% Asian, 4% Hispanic/Latino, and 3% other. 
All participants had at least obtained a bachelor’s degree. 
 
Design and Procedure  
An online survey was administered in three sections of PMBA students enrolled in a 
leadership course and taken the beginning of the 3rd week of classes. After obtaining 
consent, respondents were placed into one of the four conditions present in Study 5 by 
manipulating two dimensions (2 x 2 design): subordinate’s power and leader’s self-
perceived necessity. In the high subordinate’s power condition, participants were asked to 
respond to questions in regard to one of their previous or current higher paid and more 
influential subordinates. In the low subordinate’s power condition, participants were asked 
to respond to questions in regards to one of their previous or current lower paid and less 
influential subordinates. In the high leader’s self-perceived necessity condition, 
participants were asked to think of a previous or current context where there was great need 
for them to actively manage their employee. In the low leader’s self-perceived necessity 




little need for them to actively manage their employee.  
In all conditions, participants were asked a series of open-ended questions in regards 
to the high-/low-power employee in a high/low leader self-perceived necessity context. 
Because not all PMBA students have previous leadership experience, at the outset of the 
study, participants were asked if they have had previous organizational leadership 
experience. If participants answered negatively, they were placed in the same conditions 
listed above but asked to take the perspective of the subordinate and assess a previous 
manager. These data from a subordinate’s perspective were not used for purposes of this 
study, but will be used in a future project. If participants answered positively, the study 
proceeded as delineated (see Appendix M for full wording of the study instructions). 
These questions were created to explore what, I believe, are the mechanisms that drive 
the proposed effects in the present research. Specifically, participants were asked (1) how 
would you respond if this employee told you that they would like to perform this task 
differently than you have instructed them? (2) How would you respond if the employee 
asked you to radically change the way the task is performed even if you see little value in 
the request? (3) How would you respond if the employee asked you to radically change the 
way the task is performed assuming the task would be performed more efficiently but it 
might reflect negatively on you? (4) How would you respond if the employee asked you to 
radically change the way the task is performed assuming the task would be performed less 
efficiently but it might reflect positively on you? (5) If your boss approached you and 
commended you on your work on this task, how likely would you be to pass the credit on 
to this employee?  




the cases of those with no previous leadership experience), in the UBG with the employee 
(or manager) from the initial exercise serving as the hypothetical salient other. I had 
planned to use the same UBG from Studies 4 and 5, but due to the lack of significant 
findings from Studies 4 and 5, I chose to alter the planned design and used the one-recipient 
UBG design from Study 2A. Because the number of recipients (one versus two) 
differentially affected how subordinate’s power affected self-interested behaviors in 
Studies 2A and 2B, I believed that the number of recipients (one or two) might also affect 
the way leader’s necessity affects self-interested behaviors. Because there is only one 
recipient and a subordinate makes a request in all conditions in this study, self-interested 
behavior (allocation to self and lying) is the only dependent variable of interest. After 
completing the UBG, participants completed a brief demographics survey.  
 
Measures  
Self-interested behavior. Self-interested behavior was measured in the same two ways 
as in the previous studies: directly through the self-allocation of resources and indirectly 
through the potential misrepresentation of the pool of funds 
Comprehension check. The comprehension check questions were removed from this 
study due to time constraints. 
 
Results  
Manipulation check. The manipulation check questions were also removed from this 
study due to time constraints. 




between the power of a subordinate and the self-interested behavior of a manager is 
moderated by a manager’s self-perceived necessity — I generally reviewed the open-ended 
responses provided in the survey. Likely because the participants were in a class about 
leadership, the responses were quite homogeneous across conditions. Most participants 
made some form of claim that they would pursue the best interests of the subordinate and/or 
the company before their own self-interests. Whereas this does not provide evidence in 
support of Hypothesis 6, these results do indicate some evidence that participants shared a 
fairly homogenous prototype of leadership behavior as evidenced through the consistent 
expression of aversion to self-interested behavior. Asking participants to envision a 
leadership role appears to result in participants consistently conveying self-sacrifice in 
service of the greater good. 
To further test Hypothesis 6, I used a 2 x 2 ANOVA where subordinate’s power and 
leader’s self-perceived necessity were the independent variables and allocation to self and 
willingness to lie to the recipient were the dependent variables, respectively. Contrary to 
expectations, a leader’s self-perceived necessity did not moderate the relationship between 
a subordinate’s power and participant’s allocations to recipients, F(1, 79) = .772, p = .382, 
η2 = .01 nor lying to the recipient F(1, 79) = .047, p = .688, η2 = .002. See Table 26 for all 
means, standard deviations, and correlations. These results do not support Hypothesis 6 
and again suggest that there may be no relationship between a leader’s necessity, a 
subordinate’s power, and the self-interested behavior of a manager.  
Although these results do not support Hypothesis 6, these results do provide further 
evidence in support of Hypothesis 2. Participants with a high-power subordinate salient 




power subordinate salient (M = $52,061, SD = $8,514), F(1, 41) = 6.345, p = .014, η2 = 
.078. Furthermore, participants with a high-power subordinate salient lied marginally less 
to recipients (M = .05, SD = .15) than participants with a low-power subordinate salient (M 
= .18, SD = .40), F(1, 41) = 3.725, p = .057, η2 = .047. See Table 27 for all means and 
standard deviations by condition. See Table 28 and 29 for 2 x 2 ANOVA tables. 
 
Discussion 
Results from Study 6 do not support Hypothesis 6 by failing to demonstrate that a 
leader’s self-perceived necessity moderates the relationship between subordinates’ power 
and self-interested behavior. Although I was unable to show a moderating effect of leader’s 
self-perceived necessity, I did find additional support for Hypothesis 2 that there is a 
negative relationship between a subordinate’s power and a leader’s self-interested 
behaviors. Interestingly, across conditions, participants expressed a mostly universal 
distaste for demonstrating self-interested behavior in the qualitative responses, yet there 
was still evidence of more self-interested behavior when a low-power subordinate was 
salient. 
Because this study asks participants to envision a real person as their salient 
subordinate, this study provides a small amount of additional external validity. One 
limitation of this study was the smaller sample size due to the limited number of students 
enrolled in the class. Whereas this small sample size may have impeded some significant 
findings regarding the moderating effect of a leader’s self-perceived necessity, the fact that 
the results indicate further support of the relationship between subordinate’s power and 




Table 26: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
 
Table 27: Means and Standard Deviations by Condition 
 
 
Table 28: 2x2 ANOVA – Allocation (Self) 
 
 
Table 29: 2x2 ANOVA – Willingness to Lie 
 
M SD (1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Subordinate's Power 1.48 .50 ––
(2) Leader's Necessity 1.47 .50 -.04 ––
(3) Allocation (Self) $49,696 $8,281 .27* -.02 ––
(4) Lie to Recipient 1.89 .32 -.21 .10 -.35** ––
Note.  N = 473. Subordinate's power is coded 1 = high subordinate's power, 0 = low subordinate's power. 
Leader's Necessity is coded 1 = high leader's nedcessity, 0 = low leader's necessity.
* p  < .05. ** p  < .01.
M SD M SD
High Power Sub / High Necessity $48,409 $5,431 .09 .29
High Power Sub / Low Necessity $46,526 $9,270 .00 .00
Low Power Sub / High Necessity $51,400 $6,134 .20 .41
Low Power Sub / Low Necessity $52,722 $10,894 .17 .38
Note.  N  = 79. 
Allocation (Self) Lie
df F p η2
Subordinate's Power 1 6.345 .014 .078
Leader's Necessity 1 .024 .878 .000
Subordinate's Power X Leader's Necessity 1 .772 .382 .01
Note.  N  = 79.
df F p η2
Subordinate's Power 1 3.725 .057 .047
Leader's Necessity 1 .057 .387 .01
Subordinate's Power X Leader's Necessity 1 .047 .688 .002
Note.  N  = 79.





In this dissertation, I explored how a subordinate’s attributes can influence a leader’s 
behaviors. More specifically, I explored how subordinates’ power can influence a leader’s 
self-interest and willingness to grant requests, as well as how a leader’s self-perceived 
necessity may affect those behaviors. The theoretical premise underlying my argument is 
that individuals have prototypes of appropriate leader behaviors (Hogg, 2001a), and 
managers hope to be seen as prototypical (Hogg, 1993) particularly when attempting to 
maintain authority over valuable followers (Berscheid & Reis, 1998; DeRue & Ashford, 
2010). Across a series of seven studies, I found mixed but supportive evidence that the 
power of a subordinate can affect both self-interested and granting behaviors. 
 
Study Overview 
In Study 1, leaders with a subordinate salient made less self-interested allocations and 
lied to recipients less about those allocations than leaders with either no one or other non-
subordinates present. In Studies 2a and 6, leaders with a high-power subordinate salient 
made less self-interested allocations than leaders with a low-power subordinate salient. In 




the subordinate’s request than leaders with a low-power subordinate present. In Study 3, 
both leaders’ self-perceived efficacy and the presence of substitutes for leadership were 
shown to be important factors in determining a leader’s necessity. However, in Study 4, I 
did not find a significant relationship between a leader’s self-perceived necessity and 
leaders’ behaviors, nor did I find a moderating effect of leaders’ self-perceived necessity 
in Studies 5 or 6. Although there were some mixed results, the data of the present research 
demonstrate that the attributes of followers can shape their leaders’ behaviors. 
My findings highlight a more accurate valuation of followers in an organization by 
refuting the idea that leaders solely shape an organization by being autonomous agents that 
influence followers (Hogg, 2010). By “reversing the lens” (Shamir, 2007), the present 
research demonstrates that followers — specifically followers in a powerful role — share 
some responsibility in shaping an organization by acting as an agent of influence that 
affects leaders’ behaviors. The present findings do not inherently diminish the importance 
of leaders in organizations, but do have significant implications on the importance of the 




The findings in the present research contribute to several literatures including those on 
followership, power in hierarchies, and leadership. In the following sections, I will discuss 
the theoretical contributions made in these three areas. Whereas past research on the role 
that leaders play in shaping organizations has been rich and informative (see Avolio et al., 




followers’ role in shaping organizations.  
 
Followership and the Role of Followers  
The current research makes a contribution to the followership literature (Uhl-Bien et 
al., 2014) by exploring how followers’ characteristics affect the behavior of leaders in 
formal positions of authority. Current research investigating followership focuses mostly 
on either a follower’s actions (Bligh, 2011; DeRue & Ashford, 2010; Howell & Shamir, 
2005; Shamir, 2007; Uhl-Bien et al., 2014,) or how a follower’s attributes affect their own 
behavior (Carsten et al., 2010; Kohles, et al., 2012; Sy, 2010). The present research 
provides a better understanding of how followers’ attributes can affect those holding formal 
positions of authority. This is a contribution because it could alter the current understanding 
of the dynamic relationship between leaders and followers. By establishing that followers 
can influence leaders’ behaviors, organizations can better understand how leaders’ attitudes 
and behaviors are formed and enacted and how employees can be more effectively 
understood and utilized in organizations. By establishing that a follower’s attributes can 
affect a leader’s behaviors, the current boundaries of followership research are expanded. 
The present research also establishes that followers (i.e., subordinates) have a unique 
and influential role in organizations. The evidence indicates that the influence of a 
subordinate can go beyond simple social normative influence from the salience of another 
in an organization (Turner, 1991; Turner et al., 1987). The salience of a subordinate 
engages a manager’s prototypes for a leader (Berscheid & Reis, 1998; Epitropaki & Martin, 
2004; Gioia & Sims, 1985; Tyler, 2006) resulting in behavior that corresponds more closely 




followers in an organization may be more influential than what is currently proposed in the 
leadership literature (Avolio et al., 2009; Morgeson et al., 2009). Furthermore, because a 
follower’s attributes can influence the behavior of a leader, one must explore both a leader 
and a follower — not simply a leader in isolation — to truly understand a leader’s actions 
and behaviors.  
 
Power Across Levels of Hierarchy 
Another contribution this dissertation makes is to the literature on power across 
hierarchical levels in organizations that explores the effect of asymmetrical control of 
organizational resources (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). The present research explores how 
differential power at a lower level of a hierarchy (i.e., followers) can affect the behaviors 
of an individual at a higher level in the same hierarchy (i.e., leader/manager). Because the 
majority of organizational leadership exists formally in a hierarchy (Avolio et al., 2009; 
Magee & Galinsky, 2008), a better understanding of the nature and extent of influences 
across levels of hierarchy will serve to better understand decisions made in organizations. 
By demonstrating the upward hierarchical influence of follower’s on their leaders, I was 
able to uncover a previously unexplored phenomenon that further illuminates the dynamic 
influences that affect leaders’ actions in an organizational hierarchy.  
This research establishes empirical evidence that differences in power amongst 
subordinates differentially affects how a leader, with higher formal power than all 
subordinates, responds to those subordinates. This is a unique perspective on how power 
interacts within levels of a hierarchy and further informs how power influences individuals 




engage in less self-interested behaviors in certain contexts. As self-interest on the part of a 
leader is often at odds with the self-interest of an organization, organizations could 
potentially attenuate a leader’s self-interested tendencies by making subordinates more 
salient to their managers. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that if organizations were to 
specifically make high-power subordinates more salient to managers, then those manager’s 
self-interested tendencies may be further attenuated. 
 
Leadership 
The current research provides insight into the dynamic relationship between leaders 
and followers. The present research further informs the process by which leaders claim 
power and followers grant power (DeRue & Ashford, 2010). In order to claim power, 
leaders may need to be susceptible to the influence of their followers to some degree. 
Powerful followers may be less inclined to grant power to leaders, and leaders may 
perceive a need to be more susceptible to a powerful follower’s influence in order to claim 
or maintain power. If a leader holds a formal position of power (e.g., manager), the formal 
position itself is a claim on authority. These behavioral changes are made in an attempt to 
be granted power or maintain the granting of power from their followers.  
The evidence demonstrates that powerful followers can exert particularly strong 
influence on their leader’s behaviors, and followers assessed as low-power may be 
devalued and be less likely to influence their leaders (Kipnis, 1976; Magee & Smith, 2013). 
In the present research, leaders are shown to be particularly influenced by powerful 
followers because of a closer perceived level of power as compared to followers low in 




subordinate than a low-power subordinate. Even though the power of a subordinate should 
have little or no bearing on the legitimacy of the request, leaders were still more willing to 
grant high-power subordinate’s requests. Leaders may see powerful followers as more 
integral and less socially distant (Magee & Smith, 2013), which leads them to value 
powerful follower’s contribution and influence more than less powerful followers.  
Leaders are given the authority to make decisions on behalf of the organizations, and 
decisions made to maintain authority instead of pursuing an organizations interests could 
have deleterious organizational consequences. The willingness to grant high-power 
subordinates’ requests could simply be a utilitarian strategy to maintain the influence of 
subordinates that are perceived as more valuable (Berscheid & Reis, 1998). 
Organizationally speaking, the fact that the attributes of a follower can bias the granting of 
a request is potentially disturbing — particularly when those requests affect others in the 
organization.  
Alternately, efforts to maintain the allegiance of valuable subordinates could actually 
benefit an organization so long as those efforts are not in direct conflict with the goals of 
an organization. Because leadership is a dynamic process (DeRue & Ashford, 2010), some 
claims made by subordinates need to be granted to maintain a subordinate’s support and 
continued allegiance. One could argue that higher power subordinates are more valuable 
and have more organizational needs. Therefore, it is possible that high-power subordinates 
should have their requests granted more frequently than lower power subordinates. Even 
though this is possible, by being more aware of the tendency to grant higher power 
subordinate’s request, leaders could ensure that they appropriately satisfy the needs of both 




Limitations and Future Directions 
As with all research, these studies have limitations that must be recognized and 
explored to best understand the overall results. One of the central limitations of this 
research is the unsuccessful attempts to demonstrate the effects a leader’s self-perceived 
necessity. The leadership literature, in general, has made some progress in accepting the 
fallacy of the “romance of leadership” (Meindl et al., 1985) and some scholars have begun 
constructing frameworks around the effect of leaders on followers and the situations in 
which leaders matter (Hackman & Wageman, 2004). Additionally, some literature has 
explored the effects of ineffective leadership because substitutes for leadership exist 
(Howell, Bowen, Dorfman, Kerr, & Podsakoff, 1990; Howell & Dorfman, 1981; Howell, 
Dorfman, & Kerr, 1986; Podsakoff & MacKenzie, 1997; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Ahearne, 
& Bommer, 1995). Yet the leadership literature has yet to fully explore the implications of 
a leader that lacks necessity due either to the situation (not the right context) or their 
abilities (not the right skills). Organizations have a general proclivity towards hierarchy 
(Magee & Galinsky, 2008), but hierarchy and/or leadership must be situationally needed 
to be effective (Hackman & Wageman, 2004).  
The present research attempted to establish the effects of a leader’s self-perceived 
necessity on that leader’s behaviors. I predicted that changes in a leader’s self-perceived 
necessity would alter the demonstrated positive relationships between a subordinate’s 
power and self-interested behavior (Hypothesis 6) and granting a subordinate’s request 
(Hypothesis 7), respectively. Whereas I failed to reliably find evidence for this effect 
(Studies 4-6), I still believe that a leader’s necessity is an important and potentially fruitful 




formally — simply because that leader is not needed, it is important to understand how a 
leader can be effective even when perceived as less necessary.  
Studies 3, 4, 5, and 6 all successfully manipulated a participant’s self-perceived 
necessity. I posited that less self-perceived necessity would alter the relationship between 
subordinate’s power and a leader’s behaviors, but it is possible, and even likely, that a 
relative reduction in self-perceived necessity is insufficient. Throughout all studies that 
manipulated a leader’s self-perceived necessity, those in the low-necessity conditions 
never had a mean below the midpoint (3.5 on a 7-point scale). In other words, whereas 
participants in the low-necessity conditions did show a relative decrease in self-perceived 
necessity, all participants still perceived themselves as at least somewhat necessary. It is 
evident that a relative decrease in self-perceived necessity does not affect the positive 
relationship between a subordinate’s power and the behaviors of a leader, but it is highly 
plausible that perceiving oneself as unnecessary — as opposed to less necessary — may 
demonstrate the proposed effect. Future research should focus on the difference between 
necessary and unnecessary leaders as opposed to more and less necessary leaders. 
Because of the online and experimental nature of this dissertation, the internal validity 
of the studies is strong, but the external validity suffered. Although several effects were 
replicated across studies and Study 6 did replicate the findings from Study 2 using a real 
individual in a hypothetical scenario, the studies would benefit from increased external 
validity. The findings of the studies would be bolstered by experimentally manipulating 
groups in the lab. Furthermore, performing a quasi-experiment or survey research using 
real teams in organizations would greatly enhance the external validity of the findings. 




dissertation in actual groups. 
Another limitation of this dissertation was the narrow focus of both the attributes of a 
follower (subordinates’ power) and the behaviors of a leader (self-interested and granting 
behaviors). Although a subordinate’s power is an important attribute to understand, there 
are many more follower attributes (Uhl-Bien et al., 2014) and many of these attributes 
could potentially alter a leader’s behaviors. The focus on a specific attribute was necessary 
for the scope of this dissertation, but followership research would benefit from 
understanding how other follower attributes affect the behaviors of their leader’s. Likewise, 
I was limited in the number of leader behaviors included in the studies. I was able to 
demonstrate several leaders’ behaviors — allocations, lying, and granting requests — that 
were affected by subordinate’s power, but there are many additional leader behaviors 
(Morgeson et al., 2009), and many, if not all, could be influenced by a subordinate’s 
attributes. Exploring other leader’s behaviors relative to a follower’s attributes would be 
another great opportunity for future research. 
Finally, there were some inconsistencies in the findings for Hypothesis 2 that predict 
that there is a negative relationship between the power of a subordinate and the self-
interested behavior of a manager. Studies 2 and 6 demonstrated the negative relationship, 
but Studies 4 and 5 did not demonstrate the negative relationship. The key difference 
between these studies was the number of recipients. Studies 2 and 6 had one recipient, and 
Studies 4 and 5 had two recipients. It is possible that more recipients invokes group-level 
normative behavior (Pepitone, 1976) and having only one recipient invokes individual-
level normative behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Sherif, 1936). Because the implications 




1984; Triandis, 1994), participants may have altered their behavior based on the perception 
that their behavior was either individual- or group-oriented. By adding an additional 
recipient, the allocation decision could have shifted the decision schema from an 
individually-based decision between a dyad, to a group-based decision between three 
individuals. Although no research has yet demonstrated a link between number of 
participants and equity norms, it is also possible that having more than one recipient makes 
equity norms (Carrell & Dittrich, 1978) more salient and therefore, having more than one 
recipient attenuates self-interested behavior. Regardless of the actual mechanism — which 
would be an interesting topic for future research — it seems clear that the context of the 
allocation can alter the relationship between a subordinate’s power and a leader’s self-
interested behavior. Future studies should focus on different contexts and how those 
contexts might influence a leader’s susceptibility to a follower’s influence.  
 
Practical Implications 
Groups perform better when knowledge and expertise is identified and transferred 
within a group (Bonner & Baumann, 2012), but powerful individuals (e.g., leaders) have 
been shown to disregard the advice of experts (Tost, 2011). The current research 
demonstrates that high-power followers have a differential influence on leaders as 
compared to low-power followers. That a leader could be influenced solely by power has 
potentially troubling implications on knowledge transfer in groups. Organizations often 
hire knowledgeable individuals to enhance the organizational performance, but if managers 
are unwilling or unable to identify and transfer that knowledge, the value of the expertise 




more valuable input, but they were shown to be more influential because of their power. 
Managers should be aware that their decisions may be biased in favor of their powerful 
followers, which might lead to suboptimal decisions. 
 
Conclusion 
Most of the organizational leadership literature focuses on the vital roles that leaders 
play in an organization (Meindl et al., 1985; Morgeson et al., 2009; Sy, 2010). The core 
discussions center on the best forms of leadership (Avolio et al., 2009; DeRue & Ashford, 
2010; Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Van Knippenberg & Sitkin, 2013) or the behaviors in which 
effective leaders engage (Hackman & Wageman, 2004; Morgeson et al., 2009). The current 
research demonstrates that one-sided views of the importance of leadership may be 
obfuscating the true value of employees/followers in an organization. Followers have a 
distinct relationship with their leaders and can have significant effect on their leaders’ 
behaviors. The existence of social norms are well established in the organizational 
literature (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991), but subordinates appear to motivate a unique 
form of normative behavior in their leaders. The mere presence of a follower inhibits self-
interested behavior, and as the power of that follower increases, leaders are more likely to 
grant their requests, even when the nature of the request is the same.  
This lends credence to the supposition that there is some form of universal normative 
leader prototype that motivates leaders to appear more like “a leader” when a subordinate 
is salient. By curbing self-interested behaviors when a subordinate is salient, leaders can 
present on image of fairness and equity that appears to be universally associated with a 




directly harm the follower, leaders appear to perform some form of mental calculus 
regarding violation of this apparent “leader norm.” Leaders seem to determine that the 
indirect costs of violating this “leader norm” would be more costly than the direct benefits 
of self-interested behavior. 
Leaders are also more likely to grant requests from their higher power subordinates. 
Whereas this statement may appear obvious at first, I believe most leaders would also argue 
that a good idea would be recognized no matter the source in the organization. Instead, 
leaders appear to give undue weight to high-power subordinates and less weight to low-
power subordinates – regardless of the content of the request. This means leaders could be 
discounting the contributions of their lower power followers and over-valuing the 
contributions of their high-power follower, but it is difficult to determine if this does more 
harm than good in organizations. High-power followers may also provide more benefit to 
both the leader and the organization. Whereas the willingness to grant higher power 
subordinates’ requests may come at the cost of lower power subordinates, it may also 
ensure the continued commitment of these potentially higher value followers.  
Regardless, because followers can directly alter the way in which a leader behaves, 
each employee could have a significant impact on the effectiveness of leaders in 
organizations. Each employee should be considered as an influential agent of a leaders’ 
behavior and hired and managed accordingly. 
   
APPENDIX A 
 
STUDY 1 – INSTRUCTIONS 
 
General Instructions 
Please read the following scenario and then engage in a brief decision-making exercise. 
Read the scenario carefully because you may receive a monetary bonus depending on your 




Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. You have been asked to 
allocate a $100,000 bonus between yourself and another manager. As the other manager is 
currently unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated, you will have the 
opportunity to communicate both the total amount of bonus money and how much money 
was allocated to both yourself (Allocator) and the other manager (Recipient).  
The other manager gets no say in the bonus allocation, but if the other manager chooses 
to reject your allocation for any reason, neither of you receive a bonus at this time.  




Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. You have been asked to 
allocate an $100,000 bonus between yourself and another manager. As the other manager 
is currently unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated, you will have the 
opportunity to communicate both the total amount of bonus money and how much money 
was allocated to both yourself (Allocator) and the other manager (Recipient).  
A subordinate of one of your direct subordinates (SS1) / direct subordinate (S1) / 
subordinate of one of your colleagues (S9) / colleague of yours at work (Manager) at work 
has been assigned to help you with the logistics, but you get final say over the allocation 
decision. The subordinate of your direct subordinate / direct subordinate / subordinate of 
one of your colleagues / colleague of yours has limited input regarding the allocation 
decision. 
The other manager gets no say in the bonus allocation, but if the other manager chooses 
to reject your allocation for any reason, neither of you receive a bonus at this time. 
 
Additional Instructions 
A pilot study has been conducted that asked participants to imagine that they were the 
other manager in the above scenario. In the pilot study, participants were given information 
about different allocations and different total bonus allocation amounts. Another pilot study 
asked participants to take on the role of the other person present in the allocation decision 
along with information about their bonus preference and if they would tell the other 
managers about the total pool of funds. The information from the pilot studies will 
determine whether or not your allocation is accepted. You will only receive a bonus if your 




studies will set a minimum threshold for what the "other manager" will accept. As long as 
you do not exceed the minimum threshold, you will receive a bonus based on the amount 
that you allotted to yourself.  
 
Allocation Instructions 
In the space below, please report how you would allocate the $100,000 between 
yourself and the other manager. You must make sure that the total allocation between the 
two of you equals $100,000.  
Yourself  __________ 
Other Manager __________ 
What would you tell the other manager regarding the total size of the bonus funds 
available? You can convey any amount here.  
Other Manager __________ 
   
APPENDIX B 
 
PILOT 1 — RECIPIENT INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Role Instructions 
Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. Another manager has been 
asked to allocate a bonus between them and you. As you are currently unaware of the total 
amount of money to be allocated, you must rely on the allocating manager to know both 
the total amount of bonus money and how much money was allocated to each of you.  
You get no say in the bonus allocation, but if you choose to reject the bonus allocation 
for any reason, neither of you receive a bonus at this time. 
Your role in this survey is to determine when you might reject the allocation of the 
bonus money 
   
APPENDIX C 
 
PILOT 2 — SALIENT OTHER INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Role Instructions 
Imagine that you work at a Fortune 500 company. A manager has been asked to allocate 
an $100,000 bonus between them and another manager. The other manager is currently 
unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated so the allocating manager will have 
the opportunity to communicate both the total amount of bonus money and how much 
money was allocated to each of them.  
You have been assigned to help with the logistics of the allocation decision, but the 
allocating manager gets final say over the allocation decision. You have limited input, but 
the other manager did an unrelated personal favor for you and you have expressed to the 
allocating manager that you would appreciate it if they would give the other manager a 
little extra bonus money. 
The other manager gets no say in the bonus allocation, but if the other manager chooses 
to reject the allocation for any reason, neither receives a bonus at this time. 
   
APPENDIX D 
 
STUDY 2A - INSTRUCTIONS 
 
General Instructions 
Please read the following scenario and then engage in a brief decision-making exercise. 
Read the scenario carefully because you may receive a monetary bonus depending on your 
performance in addition to your base compensation for this study. 
 
Conditions (wording differences across conditions are indicated by italics) 
Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. You have been asked to 
allocate an $100,000 bonus between yourself and another manager. As the other manager 
is currently unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated, you will have the 
opportunity to communicate both the total amount of bonus money and how much money 
was allocated to both yourself (Allocator) and the other manager (Recipient).  
One of your more / less influential and highly / lesser paid subordinates (SS1) at work 
has been assigned to help you with the logistics, but you get final say over the allocation 
decision. During the allocation decisions, your subordinate has stated that they would 
appreciate it if more money were allotted to the other manager (Recipient). / (no additional 




the actual allocation decision. The other manager gets no say in the bonus allocation, but if 
the other manager chooses to reject your allocation for any reason, neither of you receive 
a bonus at this time.  
 
Additional Instructions 
A pilot study has been conducted that asked participants to imagine that they were the 
other manager in the above scenario. In the pilot study, participants were given information 
about different allocations and different total bonus allocation amounts. Another pilot study 
asked participants to take on the role of the other person present in the allocation decision 
along with information about their bonus preference and if they would tell the other 
managers about the total pool of funds. The information from the pilot studies will 
determine whether or not your allocation is accepted. You will only receive a bonus if your 
allocation is accepted based on the findings of the pilot studies. In other words, the pilot 
studies will set a minimum threshold for what the "other manager" will accept. As long as 
you do not exceed the minimum threshold, you will receive a bonus based on the amount 
that you allotted to yourself.  
 
Allocation Instructions 
In the space below, please report how you would allocate the $100,000 between 
yourself and the other manager. You must make sure that the total allocation between the 
two of you equals $100,000. 
Yourself  __________ 




What would you tell the other manager regarding the total size of the bonus funds 
available? You can convey any amount here.  
Other Manager __________
   
APPENDIX E 
 
STUDY 2B – INSTRUCTIONS 
 
General Instructions 
Please read the following scenario and then engage in a brief decision making exercise. 
Read the scenario carefully because you may receive a monetary bonus depending on your 
performance in addition to your base compensation for this study. 
 
Conditions (wording differences across conditions are indicated by italics) 
Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. You have been asked to 
allocate a $100,000 bonus between yourself and two other managers. As the other 
managers are currently unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated, you will have 
the opportunity to communicate both the total amount of bonus money and how much 
money was allocated to both yourself (Allocator) and the two other 
managers (Recipient1 and Recipient2).  
One of your more / less influential and higher / lesser paid subordinates (S1) at work 
has been assigned to help you with the logistics, but you get final say over the allocation 
decision. During the allocation decision, your subordinate has stated that they would 




managers (Recipient1) / (no additional information given). Your subordinate has limited 
additional input regarding the actual allocation decision.  
Neither of the other managers get a say in the bonus allocation, but if either of the other 




A pilot study has been conducted that asked participants to imagine that they were the 
other managers in the above scenario. In the pilot study, participants were given 
information about different allocations and different total bonus allocation amounts. 
Another pilot study asked participants to take on the role of the other person present in the 
allocation decision along with information about their bonus preference and if they would 
tell the other managers about the total pool of funds. The information from the pilot studies 
will determine whether or not your allocation is accepted. You will only receive a bonus 
if your allocation is accepted based on the findings of the pilot studies. In other words, the 
pilot studies will set a minimum threshold for what the "other managers" will accept. As 
long as you do not exceed the minimum threshold, you will receive a bonus based on the 
amount that you allotted to yourself. 
 
Allocation Instructions 
In the space below, please report how you would allocate the $100,000 between 
yourself and the two other managers. You must make sure that the total allocation between 




Yourself    __________ 
Other Manager 1 (Recipient1) __________ 
Other Manager 2 (Recipient2) __________ 
What would you tell each of the other managers regarding the total size of the bonus 
funds available? You can convey any amount here.  
Other Manager 1 (Recipient1) __________ 
Other Manager 2 (Recipient2) __________ 
   
APPENDIX F 
 
PILOT 3 — 2 RECIPIENTS INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Role Instructions 
Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. Another manager has been 
asked to allocate a bonus between them, you, and another manager. As you are currently 
unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated, you must rely on the allocating 
manager to know both the total amount of bonus money and how much money was 
allocated to each of you.  
You get no say in the bonus allocation, but if you choose to reject the bonus allocation 
for any reason, none of you receive a bonus at this time. 
Your role in this survey is to determine when you might reject the allocation of funds. 
   
APPENDIX G 
 
STUDY 3 – INSTRUCTIONS 
 
General Instructions 
Please read the following scenario and then answer questions regarding the scenario. 
Please read the scenario carefully. 
 
Conditions (wording differences across conditions are indicated by italics) 
Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. Your boss has asked you to 
allocate a $100,000 bonus. Your direct subordinate at work will help you with the decision, 
but you will ultimately get the final say over the allocation decision. This task has complex 
considerations / is simple and straightforward and thus requires / does not require strong 
leadership. You have been selected for this task because of your strong ability to effectively 
manage your team / despite your lack of any particular abilities to effectively manage your 
team. 
   
APPENDIX H 
 
11-ITEM MEASURE OF MANAGERIAL SELF-EFFICACY 
(ROBERTSON & SADRI, 1993) 
 
When making your best effort, would you be able to  
1) Schedule work for your subordinates? 
2) Orientate new employees? 
3) Resolve conflicts among subordinates? 
4) Negotiate with others in order to reach an agreement or solution? 
5) Make decisions on simple problems without prior approval of superiors? 
6) Make decisions on complex problems without prior approval of superiors? 
7) Plan for implementation of new contracts, policies, and procedures? 
8) Prepare or supervise the preparation of objectives and goals for your unit? 
9) Set priorities for work assigned to various work units? 
10) Measure the performance of others? 
11) Develop and control governance procedures? 
Note: Responses ranged from 1 (almost always untrue) to 5 (almost always true). 
   
APPENDIX I 
 
13-ITEM ADAPTED MEASURE OF SUBSTITUTES FOR LEADERSHIP 
(PODSAKOFF & MACKENZIE, 1993) 
 
Please rate the truthfulness of the following statements: 
1) [My subordinates] have the competence to act independently in performing my day-
to-day duties.  
2) [My subordinates] should need to receive very useful information and guidance 
from people who share their occupational specialty, but who are not members of 
my organization.  
3) In general, most of the things [my subordinates] seek and value in this world cannot 
be obtained from [their] job or employing organization.  
4) Because of the nature of the task performed, there is little doubt about the best way 
to get the work done.  
5) [My subordinates] jobs are the kind where you can make a mistake or an error and 
not be able to see that you've made it. (R)  
6) [My subordinates] get a great deal of personal satisfaction from the work [they] do.  
7) My [subordinates’] job responsibilities are clearly specified.  
8) [My subordinates] should consider the rules and policies as general guidelines, not 
as rigid and unbending. (R)  
9) [My subordinates] receive very useful information and guidance from staff 
personnel who are based outside their work unit or department.  
10) My subordinates’ job satisfaction depends to a considerable extent on members of 
their work group other than me.  
11) The only performance feedback that matters to [my subordinates] is that given me 
by me. (R)  




around when [they] are working.  
 
13) [My subordinates] like it when [I tell them] what to do. (R)  
Note: Responses ranged from 1 (almost always untrue) to (5) almost always true. (R) 
indicates reversed item.
   
APPENDIX J 
 
7-ITEM ADAPTED MEASURE OF SUBSTITUTES FOR LEADERSHIP 
(KERR & JERMIER, 1978) 
 
Based on the information available in this scenario, please answer the following 
questions: 
1) [Because of the nature of this task], there would be little doubt about the best way 
to get the work done. 
2) [Because of the nature of the allocation], nonroutine tasks would be required. 
3) [Because of the nature of this task], one could predict with near certainty the 
activities that need to be performed. 
4) There is probably only one correct way to perform [this] task. 
5) [The] task is so simple that almost anyone could perform the task after a little bit 
of instruction and experience. 
6) It would be difficult to figure out the best approach to perform [this] task (R). 
7) There would be a great deal of "second-guessing while performing [the] task (R). 
Note: Responses ranged from 1 (almost always untrue) to (5) almost always true. (R) 
indicates reversed item. 
   
APPENDIX K 
 
STUDY 4 – INSTRUCTIONS 
 
General Instructions 
Please read the following scenario and then engage in a brief decision-making exercise. 
Read the scenario carefully because you may receive a monetary bonus depending on your 
performance in addition to your base compensation for this study. 
 
Conditions (wording differences across conditions are indicated by italics) 
Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. You have been asked to 
allocate a $100,000 bonus between yourself and two other managers. As the other 
managers are currently unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated, you will have 
the opportunity to communicate both the total amount of bonus money and how much 
money was allocated to both yourself (Allocator) and the two other 
managers (Recipient1 and Recipient2).  
 One of your subordinates (S1) at work has been assigned to help you with the logistics, 
but you get final say over the allocation decision. This task has complex considerations 
and thus requires strong leadership. You have been selected for this task because of your 




does not requires strong leadership. You have been selected for this task despite your lack 
of any particular abilities to effectively manage your team. During the allocation 
decision, your subordinate has stated that they would appreciate it if more money were 
allotted to the first of the two other managers (Recipient1). Your subordinate has limited 
additional input regarding the actual allocation decision. 
Neither of the other managers get a say in the bonus allocation, but if either of the other 




A pilot study has been conducted that asked participants to imagine that they were the 
other managers in the above scenario. In the pilot study, participants were given 
information about different allocations and different total bonus allocation amounts. 
Another pilot study asked participants to take on the role of the other person present in the 
allocation decision along with information about their bonus preference and if they would 
tell the other managers about the total pool of funds. The information from the pilot studies 
will determine whether or not your allocation is accepted. You will only receive a bonus 
if your allocation is accepted based on the findings of the pilot studies. In other words, the 
pilot studies will set a minimum threshold for what the "other managers" will accept. As 
long as you do not exceed the minimum threshold, you will receive a bonus based on the 







In the space below, please report how you would allocate the $100,000 between 
yourself and the two other managers. You must make sure that the total allocation between 
the three of you equals $100,000. 
Yourself    __________ 
Other Manager 1 (Recipient1) __________ 
Other Manager 2 (Recipient2) __________ 
What would you tell each of the other managers regarding the total size of the bonus 
funds available? You can convey any amount here.  
Other Manager 1 (Recipient1) __________ 
Other Manager 2 (Recipient2) __________ 
   
APPENDIX L 
 
STUDY 5 – INSTRUCTIONS 
 
General Instructions 
Please read the following scenario and then engage in a brief decision-making exercise. 
Read the scenario carefully because you may receive a monetary bonus depending on your 
performance in addition to your base compensation for this study. 
 
Conditions (wording differences across conditions are indicated by italics) 
Imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. You have been asked to 
allocate a $100,000 bonus between yourself and two other managers. As the other 
managers are currently unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated, you will have 
the opportunity to communicate both the total amount of bonus money and how much 
money was allocated to both yourself (Allocator) and the two other 
managers (Recipient1 and Recipient2).  
One of your higher / lesser paid and more / less influential subordinates (S1) at work 
has been assigned to help you with the logistics, but you get final say over the allocation 
decision. This task has complex considerations and thus requires strong leadership. You 




simple and straightforward and does not require strong leadership. You have been selected 
for this task despite your lack of any particular abilities to effectively manage your 
team. During the allocation decision, your subordinate has stated that they would 
appreciate it if more money were allotted to the first of the two other 
managers (Recipient1). Your subordinate has limited additional input regarding the actual 
allocation decision.  
Neither of the other managers get a say in the bonus allocation, but if either of the other 




A pilot study has been conducted that asked participants to imagine that they were the 
other managers in the above scenario. In the pilot study, participants were given 
information about different allocations and different total bonus allocation amounts. 
Another pilot study asked participants to take on the role of the other person present in the 
allocation decision along with information about their bonus preference and if they would 
tell the other managers about the total pool of funds. The information from the pilot studies 
will determine whether or not your allocation is accepted. You will only receive a bonus 
if your allocation is accepted based on the findings of the pilot studies. In other words, the 
pilot studies will set a minimum threshold for what the "other managers" will accept. As 
long as you do not exceed the minimum threshold, you will receive a bonus based on the 






In the space below, please report how you would allocate the $100,000 between 
yourself and the two other managers. You must make sure that the total allocation between 
the three of you equals $100,000. 
Yourself    __________ 
Other Manager 1 (Recipient1) __________ 
Other Manager 2 (Recipient2) __________ 
What would you tell each of the other managers regarding the total size of the bonus 
funds available? You can convey any amount here.  
Other Manager 1 (Recipient1) __________ 
Other Manager 2 (Recipient2) __________ 
   
APPENDIX M 
 
STUDY 6 – INSTRUCTIONS 
 
General Instructions 
After answering the question below, this survey will ask you to recall an individual you 
have worked with in the past and then respond to questions regarding a scenario involving 
that individual. Please answer the questions to the best of your ability.   
In your previous or current work experience, have you ever held a formal leadership 
role (e.g., manager, supervisor, team lead, etc.)? 
 
Conditions (Below are the conditions for those with previous leadership experience. 
Wording differences across conditions are indicated by italics) 
Please think of a higher /lesser paid and more / less influential subordinates from your 
previous or current work experience. Now think of a task from your previous or current 
work experience where there was/is a great need / little need for you to actively manage 
your subordinates.  
You will now be asked a series of questions regarding this individual and task. 
In one sentence each, please honestly respond to the following questions regarding the 
subordinate and task that came to mind. 




perform this task differently then you have instructed them?  
 
(2) How would you respond if the employee asked you to radically change the way 
the task is performed even if you see little value in the request?  
 
(3) How would you respond if the employee asked you to radically change the way 
the task is performed assuming the task would be performed more efficiently 
but it might reflect negatively on you?  
 
(4) How would you respond if the employee asked you to radically change the way 
the task is performed assuming the task would be performed less efficiently but 
it might reflect positively on you?  
 
(5) If your boss approached you and commended you on your work on this task, 
how likely would you be to pass the credit on to this employee?  
 
Now imagine that you are a manager at a Fortune 500 company. You have been asked 
to allocate a $100,000 bonus between yourself and another manager. As the other manager 
is currently unaware of the total amount of money to be allocated, you will have the 
opportunity to communicate both the total amount of bonus money and how much money 
was allocated to both yourself (Allocator) and the other manager (Recipient).  
Imagine that your subordinate from the previous scenario has been assigned to 
help you with the logistics of the allocation, but you get final say over the allocation 
decision. This task has complex considerations and thus requires strong leadership. You 
have been selected for this task because of your strong leadership abilities. / This task is 
simple and straightforward and thus does not require strong leadership. You have been 
selected for this task despite your lack of leadership abilities. Your subordinate has limited 
additional input regarding the actual allocation decision. 
The other manager (Recipient) gets no say in the bonus allocation, but if the other 
manager chooses to reject the allocation for any reason, neither of you receives a bonus at 





In the space below, please report how you would allocate the $100,000 between 
yourself and the other manager. You must make sure that the total allocation between the 
two of you equals $100,000. 
Yourself  __________ 
Other Manager __________ 
What would you tell the other manager regarding the total size of the bonus funds 
available? You can convey any amount here.  
Other Manager __________
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